D
505
B3
1915

CORNELL
UNIVERSITY
LIBRARY

THE SECOND BELGIAN GREY BOOK.

PART 1 and
PART 2 (Section 10).

LONDON:
PRINTED UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF HIS MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE
By DARLING AND SON, LIMITED, BACON STREET, E.,
PRINTERS TO THE KING'S MOST EXCELLENT MAJESTY.

To be purchased, either directly or through any Bookseller, from
WYMAN AND SONS, LIMITED, 29, BREAMS BUILDINGS, FETTER LANE, E.C.,
and 54, ST. MARY STREET, CARDIFF; or
H.M. STATIONERY OFFICE (SCOTTISH BRANCH),
23, FORTH STREET, EDINBURGH; or
E. PONSONBY, LIMITED, 116, GRAFTON STREET, DUBLIN;
or from the Agencies in the British Colonies and Dependencies,
the United States of America and other Foreign Countries of
T. FISHER UNWIN, LIMITED, LONDON, W.C.

1915.

Price Threepence.

GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS

(with the under-mentioned exceptions)
can be purchased in the manner indicated on the first page of this wrapper.
Accredited Agents of Free Public Libraries are entitled to a discount of 25 per cent. from published prices.

Hydrographical Publications of the Admiralty are sold by—
J. D. Potter, 145, Minories, London, E.C.

Patent Office Publications are sold at—
The Patent Office, 25, Southampton Buildings, Chancery Lane, London, W.C.
(N.B.—Classified Abridgments of Patent Specifications are sold also by Wyman and Sons, Ltd.)

Ordnance Survey and **Geological Survey Publications** can be purchased from—
The Director General of the Ordnance Survey, Southampton ; or
The Superintendent, Ordnance Survey, Dublin ; or
Agents in most of the chief towns in the United Kingdom.
(N.B.—**Small Scale Maps** are, as a rule, procurable at Railway Bookstalls in England and Wales.)

The **Journal of the Board of Agriculture and Fisheries** is published monthly by the Board, at 4, Whitehall Place, London, S.W. Price 4*d.*, post free.

The **London Gazette** is published on Tuesday and Friday evenings by Wyman and Sons, Ltd. Price 1*s.*

The following is a list of some Parliamentary and Official Publications relating to the European War, 1914–15 :—

PROTEST BY THE BELGIAN GOVERNMENT

against the German allegation that Belgium had forfeited her Neutrality before the Outbreak of War.

Price 1*d.*, post free 1½*d.*

BELGIAN REFUGEES.

Questions arising in connection with the Reception and Employment of Belgian Refugees in this Country.

First Report of the Departmental Committee appointed by the President of the Local Government Board.

[Cd. 7750] of Session 1914–15. Price 6½*d.*, post free 8½*d.*

Minutes of Evidence taken before the Committee.

[Cd. 7779] of Session 1914–15. Price 1*s.* 10*d.*, post free 2*s.* 2*d.*

VIOLATION OF THE RIGHTS OF NATIONS AND OF THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF WAR IN BELGIUM.

Reports of the Official Commission of the Belgian Government.

Preface, "*Pro luce et pro jure*," by Monsieur J. Van Den Heuvel, Minister of State. Refers generally to :—Outrages committed by the German Soldiery; Proclamations issued by the German Commanders ; Denials of the Outrages in the Appeal made to civilised nations by German Professors ; The uniform character of the Atrocities proving that they were the deliberate manifestations of a policy and not the isolated acts of irresponsible creatures ; The Violation, by Germany and Austria, of the Neutrality of Belgium ; Requisitions, by the Germans, of Belgian Property ; Unjustifiable Bombardments of towns; Airship Bombardments of undefended localities; Execution of Hostages; Fines levied on towns, &c. ; &c.

Names of the Commission of Enquiry.

Reports of the Commission :—(1) Sack of Aerschot ; Suburbs of Aerschot; Rethy. (2) Sack of Louvain ; Suburbs of Louvain and of Malines. (3) Sack of Louvain ; Sack of Visé ; Suburbs of Louvain, Malines, and Vilvorde. (4) Sack of Aerschot ; Evidence as to Damage. (5) Sack of Aerschot and

THE SECOND BELGIAN GREY BOOK.

PART 1 and PART 2 (Section 10).

LONDON:
PRINTED UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF HIS MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE
By DARLING AND SON, LIMITED, BACON STREET, E.,
PRINTERS TO THE KING'S MOST EXCELLENT MAJESTY.

To be purchased, either directly or through any Bookseller, from
WYMAN AND SONS, LIMITED, 29, BREAMS BUILDINGS, FETTER LANE, E.C.,
and 54, ST. MARY STREET, CARDIFF; or
H.M. STATIONERY OFFICE (SCOTTISH BRANCH),
23, FORTH STREET, EDINBURGH; or
E. PONSONBY, LIMITED, 116, GRAFTON STREET, DUBLIN;
or from the Agencies in the British Colonies and Dependencies,
the United States of America and other Foreign Countries of
T. FISHER UNWIN, LIMITED, LONDON, W.C.

1915.

Price Threepence.

D
505
B3
1915

Prefatory Note.

The first Grey Book, published by the Belgian Government in the month of September, 1914, contains the principal documents relating to the declarations of war made to Belgium by Germany and Austria-Hungary. (August 2nd and 28th.)

The second Grey Book contains in the First Part, besides certain documents relating to the war, the correspondence on the subject of the rupture of diplomatic relations between Belgium and Turkey. (November 6th.)

The Second Part contains the protests addressed by the Belgian Government to the German and Austro-Hungarian Governments, up to the 1st of May, 1915, against the violations of the laws of war and of the Hague Conventions.

Note to English Edition.

The translation contains only those portions of the Book which are material to the position of Great Britain, namely, the whole of the first part, and Section 10 *of the second part, which deals with the accusations brought against Belgium of having concluded a military agreement with Great Britain.*

The official Belgian edition (Correspondance Diplomatique relative à la Guerre de 1914–1915, *II.) is published in Paris by Librairie Hachette et Cie,* 79, *Boulevard Saint-Germain. (London:* 18, *King William Street, Strand.) Price: Ofr.* 75.

55159B

PART I.

No. 1.

The Belgian Minister at Paris to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

SIR, *Paris, February 22nd*, 1913.

IN the course of the interview which I had this morning with M. de Margerie, formerly French Minister in China and Assistant to the Director-General of Politicial Affairs, he questioned me on the passing of our military law, its importance, its significance, its object, and its chances of success in Parliament.

I gave a suitable reply, remarking, with all necessary reservations, that the close relations into which Great Britain had recently entered with certain Great Powers did not leave her in the same position towards us which she had formerly occupied, although the existence of a free and independent Belgium continues to be a vital necessity for her policy. Our wish is, if possible, to prevent Belgium from again becoming the battlefield of Europe, as she has been too often in the past.

I added that it was the intention of Belgium to possess an army which should be strong enough to be taken seriously and which would allow her to fulfil completely her duty of safeguarding her independence and neutrality.

"That is excellent," M. de Margerie replied, "but are not your new armaments actuated by the fear that your neutrality might be violated by France?" "No," I replied, "they are no more directed against France than against Germany; they are intended to prevent anyone, whoever he may be, from entering the country. M. Poincarè has assured me that France would never take the initiative in violating our neutrality, but that if the German armies should enter Belgium and we should not be strong enough to drive them back, the Government of the Republic would consider themselves justified in taking whatever steps they thought expedient to defend French territory, either upon their own frontier or, if the General Staff thought it more expedient, to advance to meet the Imperial armies.

"I cannot." I added, "doubt M. Poincarè's word. I place every trust in his statements, and I am even bound to say that in my humble opinion, and I only speak now as a private individual, it seems to me that strategically it would be more advantageous to Germany to make use of Belgium as a road whereby a blow could be struck at the heart of France not far from the capital, than it would be for the armies of the Republic to go and attack the German frontier in the neighbourhood of Aix-la-Chapelle. But, as I have already said, we are not relying on any balancing of probabilities; besides what may be true to-day may not be so to-morrow, since new circumstances may arise, and

(5981—8.) Wt. 33160—328. 20,000. 10/15. D & S. G. 2. A 2

our sole object is to prevent, so far as our strength allows, any violation of our neutrality."

M. de Margerie showed sustained interest in our conversation as to the defence of Belgium. I have no doubt that he will repeat what I said to those whom it concerns.

(Signed) BARON GUILLAUME.

No. 2.

The Belgian Minister at Berlin to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

SIR, *Berlin, April 2nd,* 1914.

THE French Ambassador this morning communicated to me in confidence a conversation which he had had quite recently with Herr von Jagow after a private dinner at which he was the guest of the latter.

During a recent absence of M. Cambon, the Secretary of State for the Colonies met the French Chargé d'Affaires at an evening party, and, a few days afterwards, the Naval Attachè, and said to them that Germany and France ought to come to an understanding as to the construction and linking-up of the railway lines which those countries proposed to build in Africa in order that these lines should not compete with one another.

M. Cambon asked the meaning of these overtures. Herr von Jagow replied that the question was still under consideration, but that he, as well as Herr Solf, thought that an understanding between the two countries and also with England would be very useful. "In that case," replied the Ambassador, "it would be necessary to invite Belgium to confer with us, for that country is building new railway lines in the Congo, and in my view it would be preferable that the conference should take place at Brussels."

"Oh no!" replied the Secretary of State, "for it is at the expense of Belgium that our agreement would have to be reached" —"How would that be?"—"Do you not think that King Leopold has placed too heavy a burden on the shoulders of Belgium? Belgium is not rich enough to develope this vast domain. It is an enterprise which is beyond her financial means and her power of expansion. She will be obliged to give it up."

M. Cambon thought this view altogether exaggerated.

Herr von Jagow did not consider himself beaten. He developed the view that only the Great Powers are in a condition to colonize. He disclosed even what was at the bottom of his mind, arguing that in the transformation which was going on in Europe to the advantage of the strongest nationalities, as a result of the development of economic forces and means of communication, small States could no longer lead the independent existence which they had enjoyed up to the present. They were destined to disappear or to gravitate into the orbit of the Great Powers.

M. Cambon replied that these views were by no means those of France nor, so far as he knew, those of Great Britain; that he still thought that certain agreements were necessary for the proper development of Africa, but that on the conditions set out by Herr von Jagow no understanding was possible.

On receiving this reply Herr von Jagow hastened to say that he had only expressed his personal views and that he had only spoken in his private capacity and not as Secretary of State addressing the French Ambassador.

M. Cambon, none the less, takes a very serious view of the opinions which Herr von Jagow did not hesitate to disclose in this conversation. He thought that it was in our interest to know the views with which the official who directs the German policy is animated in respect to small States and their colonies.

I thanked the Ambassador for his confidential communication. You will certainly appreciate its full gravity.

(Signed) BARON BEYENS.

No. 3.

The Belgian Minister at Vienna to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

SIR, *Vienna, July 22nd,* 1914.

I HAVE the honour to lay before you the information which I have been able to collect on the question of the relations between the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the Kingdom of Serbia.

Ten days ago the attitude at the Ballplatz was very warlike. The Minister for Foreign Affairs and his principal advisers used very aggressive language. They appeared determined to give to the *demarche* about to be made at Belgrade a very energetic character and, foreseeing a refusal on the part of the Serbian Government to submit to all the conditions which were to be imposed, they showed no hesitation in admitting the necessity for armed intervention. Already the numbers of the eight army corps to be used for the invasion of Serbia were mentioned, and people talked of nothing less than applying to this kingdom the treatment formerly inflicted upon Poland by dividing her territory between the neighbouring states. It seemed that Count Berchtold intended at one blow to take his revenge for the successive checks which his policy has suffered during recent years. It was the practical application of the theory dear to those who have been preaching for long "that the Serbian question must be dealt with once and for all."

In the inner circles of the Austrian Government there does not appear to have been any protest against such designs, and if the same view had been taken at Budapest it would not have been impossible that the Emperor, in spite of his leanings to peace, should have ranged himself with the unanimous opinion of his advisers.

It is the Prime Minister of Hungary, who has twice visited Vienna, who tried to rein in these warlike ardours. As a prudent and far-sighted statesman, Count Tisza pointed out the great danger which lay in the Austro-Hungarian Government committing itself lightly to such an adventure, and insisted vigorously on the adoption of a more moderate attitude.

Indeed, it seems very difficult not to come to the conclusion that an armed conflict between the monarchy and her neighbour would contain at least the germ of a European conflagration. It is true that the Austro-Hungarian press, which talks every day of war with Serbia as not only possible but probable, affects to prophesy that the war would remain localised between these two Powers. "We should have the moral support of Germany," they say. "England and France will not be interested in the question, and Russia far from intervening will on the contrary advise Serbia to give us full satisfaction." This reasoning is evidently the fruit of a very exaggerated optimism.

I cannot admit for a moment that the Serbian Government and the enlightened party in that country have any reason to reproach themselves for the murder of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife, as many people here allege. On the contrary I am convinced that this unhappy event must have produced a painful impression in Serbia, since people there were in truth very anxious to maintain good relations with Austro-Hungary.

The Russian Ambassador at Vienna, who goes away to-day on leave but declares himself ready to return to his post at the least alarm, declares that the Czar's Government will invite King Peter's counsellors to accept every demand addressed to them in courteous terms, and having a direct bearing on the murder. The same course would be taken with respect to the dissolution of certain societies whose irredentist tendencies are too much accentuated. "But," says M. Schebeko, "we should not allow Serbia to be made the subject of a general attack intended to discredit her."

I have every reason to believe that M. Pachitch will follow the first part of this advice, but that he will show himself very determined if there should be any question of conditions which he could not fulfil legally or which would inflict a direct blow upon the national pride. In particular, so far as the dissolution of societies is concerned, it is worthy of remark that the Serbian constitution, which is very liberal, guarantees the right of association and in addition it is not a few societies only which take the reconstitution of "Greater Serbia" for their political programme, but the whole population of the country cherishes this dream.

What is more, the Prime Minister at Belgrade certainly takes into consideration that the whole of the mixture of jougo-Slavs who inhabit the south of the Monarchy is composed of Serbians, Bosnians, Slovenes, and Croates who are favourable to his cause. The latter, in spite of their difference of religion, are greatly dissatisfied with the regime to which Hungary subjects them, and the great majority of them, in spite of what is alleged here on the subject, extend their full sympathies to Serbia.

Apart from the possible intervention of Russia and the uncertain part which might be played by Roumania, there is in this state of things a very real danger for Austro-Hungary, and Count Tisza's moderating words show it sufficiently. Will his influence prevail to the last? Count Berchtold has just gone to Ischl to report to the Emperor; it seems that the present uncertain situation cannot continue for long, and that an early decision must be taken.

(Signed) COUNT ERREMBAULT DE DUDZEELE.

No. 4.

The Belgian Minister at Berlin to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

SIR, *Berlin, July 24th,* 1914.

THE publication of the ultimatum addressed yesterday by the Cabinet of Vienna to that of Belgrade goes far beyond anything that the most pessimistic anticipations of which I informed you in my report of the 16th of this month had anticipated. Evidently Count Berchtold and Count Tisza, the responsible authors of this sudden blow, have come under the influence of the military party and the Austro-Hungarian General Staff. The result of such a lack of moderation and discretion will inevitably be to attract the sympathies of the great mass of European public opinion to Serbia, in spite of the horror caused by the murders of Serajevo. Even at Berlin, to judge by the Liberal papers, one has the impression that the Austro-Hungarian demands are considered excessive. "Austro-Hungary," says the *Vossische Zetiung* this morning, "will have to prove the grave accusations which she brings against Serbia and her Government by publishing the results of the judicial enquiry held at Serajevo."

Herr von Jagow and Herr Zimmermann had assured us last week that they did not know the decisions taken by the Vienna Cabinet, nor the extent of the Austro-Hungarian demands. How can we believe in this ignorance to-day? It is improbable that the Austro-Hungarian statesmen should have made up their minds to such a step, the most dangerous stroke which their diplomacy has ever ventured against a Balkan State, without having consulted their colleagues at Berlin, and without having obtained the assent of the Emperor William. The fact that the Emperor has given a free hand to his allies in spite of the risk of bringing on a European conflict, is explained by the fear and horror which he has of regicides.

"What is Serbia going to do" was the question which the majority of my colleagues were asking this morning; "Will she turn to Russia and beg for her support by telegram?" If she does so, she cannot receive any reply before the expiration of the time limit in the Austrian ultimatum. Russia will be obliged as a preliminary to concert measures with France and, very astutely, the Cabinet of Vienna has postponed the outbreak of the storm until the moment when M. Poincaré and M. Viviani are on their voyage between St. Petersburg and Stockholm.

The threatening tone in which the Austro-Hungarian note is couched is all the more unfortunate because the Russian Ambassador at Vienna, I learn, had recently informed Count Berchtold that his Government would support the Austro-Hungarian demands with the Pashitch Cabinet if those demands were moderate.

To-day a new crisis has begun, recalling the crisis of 1909 after the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovine. The best we can hope is that it will not develop in a more tragic manner, in spite of the bellicose wishes of the Austrian General Staff, which are perhaps shared by that at Berlin. The best advice to give to Serbia would be to invite the mediation and intervention of the Great Powers.

BARON BEYENS.

No. 5.

The Belgian Minister at Vienna to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

SIR, *Vienna, July* 25, 1914.

THE situation has suddenly become very serious. It was obvious that an early *demarche* by Austro-Hungary to Serbia was to be expected. But the note delivered on the 23rd of this month by a representative of the Monarchy at Belgrade to Dr. Paccu, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, puts forward demands which are more excessive and imposes conditions which are harder than I had foreseen.

The press here is unanimous in stating that the conditions imposed on Serbia are not of such a nature as to wound her national pride and dignity and that, therefore, Serbia can and ought to accept them. But at the same time the press implicitly admits the rigorous nature of these conditions, since it expresses only a very faint hope that King Peter's Government will submit to them. Not to mention the humiliating declaration to be inserted in the official Journal and the Order of the day to the Army, paragraph 5 would evidently constitute an excessive interference with the internal affairs of the country. It would amount to a complete delivery of Serbia to the suzerainty of the Monarchy.

Certainly, a refusal might have the gravest consequences from the international point of view. It may provoke a European conflict and cause enormous economic losses. In a few hours the purport of the Serbian reply will be known, but it is extremely improbable that it will be of such a nature as to give satisfaction. Besides, King Peter and his Government would provoke a revolution in the country if they showed any tendency to make such concessions. This fact must clearly have been taken into consideration at the Ballplatz, and it also appears as if such hard conditions had only been imposed because it was hoped that they would be refused, because it was wished "to have done with Serbia once and for all."

(Signed) COMTE ERREMBAULT DE DUDZEELE.

No. 6.

The Belgian Minister at Berlin to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

SIR, *Berlin, July 25, 1914.*

THE situation has grown no worse since yesterday, but this does not mean that it has grown any better.

As unfavourable symptoms, mention must first be made of the language used at the Wilhelmstrasse to the members of the diplomatic body: The Imperial Government approves the *demarche* made by the Austro-Hungarian Government at Belgrade, and does not consider it excessive in form. An end must be made of the murder plots and revolutionary intrigues which are hatched in Serbia. Herr von Jagow and Herr Zimmermann would not talk in this way if they had not received orders to this effect from the Emperor, who has determined in the interests of dynastic friendship to support Austria-Hungary to the last, and who is susceptible to the very legitimate fears inspired by outrages against Royal personages.

It should, further, be remarked that the German press, with the exception of course of the socialist papers, appears to have recovered from first astonishment caused by the Austro-Hungarian note. It plays the part of chorus to the press of Vienna and Budapest, and contemplates coolly the contingency of war while expressing the hope that it will remain localised.

Finally, the view gains ground more and more among my colleagues—and I believe it to be well founded—that it is not so much a desire to avenge the death of the Hereditary Archduke and to put an end to the pan-Serbian propaganda, as an anxiety for a personal rehabilitation as a statesman which has induced Count Berchtold to send to Belgrade this incredible and unprecedented note. From the moment when his personal feelings and reputation are at stake it will be very difficult for him to draw back, to temporise and not to put his threats into execution.

The favourable signs are less evident. However, they deserve to be pointed out. Not to mention European public opinion, which would not understand the necessity for taking up arms to determine a dispute whose settlement is undoubtedly within the sphere of diplomacy, it appears impossible not to notice the general movement of reaction and disapproval which manifests itself outside Germany and Austro-Hungary against the terms of Count Berchtold's ultimatum. The Vienna Cabinet, which was right in substance, is wrong in form. The demand for satisfaction is just; the procedure employed to obtain it is indefensible.

Although Count Berchtold has skillfully chosen his moment to act—the British Cabinet being absorbed in the question of Home Rule and Ulster, the head of the French State and his Prime Minister being on a journey, and the Russian Government being obliged to put down important strikes—the fact that the Austrian Minister has thought himself bound to send to the Great Powers an explanatory memorandum, gives to those Powers, and particularly those of the Triple Entente, the right to reply, that is to say, to open a discussion and intervene in favour of Serbia.

and enter into negotiation with the Cabinet of Vienna. If it is done at the earliest moment possible, a great gain in favour of the maintenance of European peace will result. Even a hasty military demonstration by the Austro-Hungarian army against Belgrade, after the refusal of the Serbian Government to accept the ultimatum, might, perhaps, not produce irremediable consequences.

Lastly, the three members of the Triplice are not in perfect agreement in the present dispute. It would not be surprising if the Italian Government should determine to play a separate part and seek to intervene in the interests of peace.

BARON BEYENS.

No. 7.

The Belgian Chargé d'Affaires at St. Petersburg to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs. (Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, July 26, 1914.

THE Minister for Foreign Affairs stated yesterday that Russia will not permit Austria-Hungary to crush Serbia, to whom, however, moderating advice has been given, counselling her to give way on the points of the ultimatum which have a judicial and not a political character. The Russian Government thinks that the situation is very serious.

(Signed) BARON DE L'ESCAILLE.

No. 8.

The Belgian Minister at Berlin to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

SIR, *Berlin, July* 26, 1914.

WHAT I have to tell you on the subject of the crisis is so serious that I have decided to send you this report by special messenger. The reports which I have committed to the post, with a fear lest they should be read by the German *cabinet noir*, necessarily contained opinions of a much more optimistic nature.

Repeated conversations, which I had yesterday with the French Ambassador, the Dutch and Greek Ministers, and the British Chargé d'Affaires, raise in my mind the presumption that the ultimatum to Serbia is a blow prepared by Vienna and Berlin, or rather designed here and executed at Vienna. It is this fact which creates the great danger. The vengeance to be taken for the murder of the hereditary Archduke, and the pan-Serbian propaganda would only serve as a pretext. The object sought, in addition to the annihilation of Serbia and of the aspirations of the jougo-Slavs, would be to strike a mortal blow at Russia and France, in the hope that England would remain aloof from the struggle.

To justify these conclusions I must remind you of the opinion which prevails in the German General Staff that war with France and Russia is unavoidable and near—*an opinion which the Emperor has been induced to share.* Such a war, warmly desired by the military and pan-German party, might be undertaken to-day, as this party think, in circumstances which are extremely favourable to Germany, and which probably will not again present themselves for some time: "Germany has finished the strengthening of her army which was decreed by the law of 1912, and on the other hand she feels that she cannot carry on indefinitely a race in armaments with Russia and France which would end by her ruin. The *Wehrbeitrag* has been a disappointment for the Imperial Government to whom it has demonstrated the limits of the national wealth. Russia has made the mistake of making a display of her strength before having finished her military reorganisation. That strength will not be formidable for several years; at the present moment it lacks the railway lines necessary for its deployment. As to France, M. Charles Humbert has revealed her deficiency in guns of large calibre; but, apparently it is this arm that will decide the fate of battles. For the rest, England, which during the last two years Germany has been trying, not without some success, to detach from France and Russia, is paralysed by internal dissensions and her Irish quarrels."

In the eyes of my colleagues as well as in my own, the existence of a plan concerted between Berlin and Vienna is proved by the obstinacy with which the Wilhemstrasse denies having had knowledge of the tenour of the Austrian note prior to Thursday last. It was also only on Thursday last that it was known at Rome, from which circumstance arises the vexation and dissatisfaction displayed here by the Italian Ambassador. How can it be admitted that this note, which, owing to the excessive severity of its terms and the shortness of the period allowed to the Cabinet of Belgrade for their execution is destined to render war immediate and unavoidable, was drafted without consultation with and without the active collaboration of the German Government, seeing that it will involve the most serious consequences for that Government? An additional fact, which proves the intimate co-operation of the two Governments, is their simultaneous refusal to prolong the period allowed to Serbia. After the request for an extension formulated by the Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Vienna had been refused yesterday at the Ballplatz, here, at the Wilhelmstrasse, Herr von Jagow evaded similar requests presented by the Russian and English Chargés d'Affaires who, in the name of their respective Governments, claimed the support of the Berlin Cabinet for the purpose of inducing Austria to grant Serbia a longer interval in which to reply. Berlin and Vienna were at one in their desire for immediate and inevitable hostilities. The paternity of the scheme, as well as of the procedure employed, which are, on account of their very cleverness, worthy of a Bismarck, is attributed here, in the diplomatic world, to a German rather than to an Austrian brain. The

secret had been well guarded, and the execution of the scheme followed with marvellous rapidity.

It should be observed that, even if the secret aim of the statesmen of the two empires is not to make the war general and force Russia and France to take part, but merely to destroy the power of Serbia and prevent her from carrying on her clandestine propaganda, the result is the same. It is impossible that that result has not been perceived by the far-seeing rulers of the German Empire. On either of these assumptions, the intervention of Russia would appear inevitable; they must have deliberately faced this complication, and prepared themselves to support their allies with vigour. The prospect of a European war has not caused them an instant's hesitation, if, indeed. the desire to evoke it has not been the motive of their actions.

Diplomatic relations between Austria and Serbia have been broken off since yesterday evening. Events are developing rapidly. It is expected here that the Serbian King, together with his Government and the Army, will withdraw to the newly-annexed territories, and allow the Austrian troops to occupy Belgrade and the country abutting on the Danube, without offering any resistance. Then, however, arises the painfully acute question: what will Russia do?

We too must put this disquieting question to ourselves. and hold ourselves in readiness for ihe worst eventualities, for the European war, of which people were always talking on the agreeable assumption that it would never break out has now become a threatening reality.

The tone of the semi-official German press is more moderate this morning and suggests the possibility of a localisation of the war, only however at the cost of the *désintéressement* of Russia, who is to content herself with the assurance that the territorial integrity of Serbia will be respected. Is not the aim of this language to give some satisfaction to England and also to German public opinion which, in spite of yesterday's Austrophile demonstrations in the streets of Berlin, is still pacific and alarmed? In any event the *dénouement* of the crisis, whatever it may be, is apparently to be expected soon.

I am, &c.,

(Signed) BARON BEYENS.

No. 9.

The Belgian Minister at Vienna to Mr. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

SIR, *Vienna, July 26th,* 1914.

As I foresaw, the Serbian Government's reply to the Austro-Hungarian note has been found insufficient by the representative of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy at Belgrade

General Baron von Giesl left immediately with all his staff: mobilisation has been ordered on both sides, and war appears imminent.

The very severe terms of the above mentioned note, the refusal to enter into any discussion upon them, and the brevity of the period given, seem to show clearly that the position arrived at is precisely that which was desired here. It is evident that the action undertaken by the Austro-Hungarian Government had been fully approved in Berlin. Some persons go so far as to maintain that Count Berchtold adopted this course under both the encouragement and the pressure of the German Government, who would not shrink from the danger of a general conflagration, and would prefer now to come into conflict with France and Russia, where preparations are insufficient, whilst in three years these two powers would have completed their military reorganisation.

Yesterday the Austrian papers reproduced a communiqué published by the telegraphic agency of St. Petersburg, to the effect that Russia could not be indifferent towards the events which had supervened between Austria-Hungary and Serbia.

Yesterday. on the other hand, the Russian Chargé d'Affaires made an official *démarche* at the Ballplatz with the object of gaining an extension of the time limit for Serbia, and received a polite refusal.

These facts in themselves do not enable us to predict with absolute assurance that the Czar will take up arms on Serbia's behalf. On the other hand, however, it seems very difficult to assume that Russia will remain as a passive spectator of the crushing of this Slavonic state.

At Belgrade, where an unqualified submission would very probably have provoked a revolution and endangered the lives of the Sovereign and his ministers, the object will have been to gain time. It is to be supposed that the reply handed by Mr. Pachitch to General von Giesl made important concessions as regards a large number of the conditions demanded, especially in relation to those referring to the assassination of the Archduke Franz-Ferdinand, and the possibility of arriving at a compromise need not be despaired of if the Powers, animated by a sincere desire for the maintenance of peace, made all possible efforts to attain that result. It is highly desirable that this solution should be found. Unfortunately, however, the very resolute attitude of Austria-Hungary, and the support accorded to her by Germany, permit of but faint hopes on this head.

I am, &c.,

(Signed) COUNT ERREMBAULT DE DUDZEELE.

No. 10.

The Belgian Minister at Berlin to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, July 27, 1914.

SIR,

THE contradictory opinions which I have gathered to-day in the course of my conversations with my Colleagues, render it difficult for me to form a precise opinion on the situation as it presents itself at the end of the third day of the crisis. I thought that it would be safest to speak to the Under Secretary of State himself, but I did not succeed in seeing Herr Zimmermann until 8 o'clock in the evening, and immediately on my return to the Legation (without even leaving time to take a copy of it, for I wish that this letter may go by the last train this evening) I am sending you a memorandum of our conversation.

The Under Secretary of State spoke to me as follows: —

"It is neither at our instigation nor by our advice that Austria has made the *démarche* which you know of to the Cabinet of Belgrade. The reply has not been satisfactory and to-day Austria is mobilising. She will carry the matter through. She cannot draw back without losing all her prestige both within and without the Monarchy. It is now a question of existence for her, to be or not to be. She must cut short the audacious propaganda which aims at her internal disintegration, and at the rebellion of all her slavonic provinces in the Danube Valley. She must also avenge, in a striking manner, the assassination of the Archduke. For that a severe and salutary lesson must be administered to Serbia by means of a military expedition. A war between Austria and Serbia cannot then be avoided.

"England has asked us to combine with her, and with France and Italy, with a view to preventing the extension of the conflict and the breaking out of hostilities between Austria and Russia, or rather the British proposal contemplates a peaceful settlement of the Austro-Serbian dispute so that it may not spread to other nations. We have replied that we desired nothing better than to aid in circumscribing the conflict by making representations in that sense to St. Petersburg and Vienna, but that we would not press Austria not to inflict an exemplary punishment on Serbia. We have promised our support and assistance to our allies, if any other nation puts obstacles in the way of this. We shall keep our promise. If Russia mobilises her army, we shall immediately mobilise our own, and war will then become general; it will be a war involving the whole of central Europe and even the Balkan peninsula, for the Roumanians, the Bulgarians, the Greeks, and the Turks will be unable to resist the temptation to take part in it, one against another.

"Yesterday I said to M. Boghitschewitsh (the former Serbian Chargé d'affaires, who was highly esteemed at Berlin but who was unfortunately transferred to Cairo; he is on a

short visit here) that the best advice that I could give to his country, would be not to oppose Austria otherwise than by a pretence of military resistance, and to conclude peace at the earliest possible moment by accepting all the conditions demanded by the Cabinet of Vienna. I added that if a general war breaks out and results in a victory for the armies of the Triple Alliance, Serbia will practically cease to exist as a nation, she will be erased from the map of Europe. She had better not expose herself to such a risk.

"In the meantime I do not wish to conclude this conversation on too pessimistic a note. I have some hope that a general conflagration can be avoided. We are informed by telegraph from St. Petersburg that M. Sazonow is more disposed to consider the situation calmly. I hope that we shall be able to dissuade him from intervening in favour of Serbia, whose territorial integrity and future independence Austria is determined to respect, once she has obtained satisfaction."

I represented to Herr Zimmermann that according to certain of my colleagues who had read the Belgrade Cabinet's reply, this was a complete capitulation to the Austrian demands, to which satisfaction had been given subject to merely formal limitations. The Under Secretary of State replied that he had no knowledge of the reply and, moreover, that nothing could prevent a military demonstration by Austria-Hungary. Such is the situation.

I am, etc.,

(Signed) BARON BEYENS.

No. 11.

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Minister at Vienna. (Telegraphic.)

Brussels, July 27, 1914.

I HAVE received your report of the 25th inst. Please telegraph what stage the mobilisation has reached and when hostilities may be expected to begin. Your colleague in Berlin writes on the 26th that in his opinion Germany and Austria-Hungary have taken stock together of all the consequences which might follow from the ultimatum addressed to Serbia and have decided to go to any lengths. We ought to be properly informed with a view to our own course of action.

(Signed) DAVIGNON.

No. 12.

The Belgian Minister at Berlin to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, July 28, 1914.

SIR,

EVENTS are moving so rapidly that one must be on one's guard against making predictions, especially too favourable ones, in case they are falsified by facts. It is more profitable to seek to unravel the causes of the present crisis in order to understand its development, as far as possible, and forecast its conclusion.

This is what I tried to do in my report of the 26th July. The opinion which I expressed in the first part of it still seems to me the soundest. I am bound, however, to submit to you to-day a divergent opinion because it comes from a man who is in a position to form a good judgment on the situation, the Italian Ambassador, with whom I had a conversation yesterday.

According to M. Bollati the German Government, whilst agreeing in principle with the Vienna Cabinet as to the necessity of striking a blow at Serbia, was ignorant of the purport of the Austrian Note, or, in any case, did not know that it was couched in terms so violent and so unusual in the language of diplomacy. At Vienna, as at Berlin, they were persuaded that Russia, in spite of the official assurances recently exchanged between the Tsar and M. Poincaré on the subject of the full preparedness of the two armies of the Dual Alliance, was incapable of engaging in a European War and would not dare to launch herself upon so formidable an adventure—disquieting internal situation; revolutionary intrigues afoot; military equipment incomplete; means of communication inadequate; all these reasons must force the Russian Government to be an impotent spectator of the execution of Serbia. The same low estimate is taken, not indeed of the French army, but of the spirit which prevails in Governmental circles in France.

The Italian Ambassador believes that a great mistake is being made here as to the steps which the Government of the Czar will decide to take. According to him, the Russian Government will find itself forced to the necessity of making war, in order not to lose all authority and all prestige in the eyes of the Slavs. Inaction, in the presence of Austria's entry into the field, would be equivalent to suicide. M. Bollati has given me to understand that a European War would not be popular in Italy. The Italian people has no interest in the destruction of the power of Russia, who is Austria's enemy. They need at the present moment to remain quiet and aloof (*se recueillir*) in order to solve at their leisure other problems which are of more urgent concern to them.

The impression that Russia is incapable of meeting the strain of a European War prevails not only within the circle of the Imperial Government but amongst the German industrials who specialise in the production of material of war. One of these, whose opinion carries the greatest authority, Herr Krupp von Bohlen, has assured one of my colleagues that the Russian artillery is far from being good or complete, whilst that of the

German army has never been of a finer quality. It would be madness, he added, for Russia to declare war on Germany under these conditions.

The Serbian Government, taken by surprise at the suddenness of the Austrian Ultimatum has, nevertheless, replied before the expiry of the time-limit, to the demands of the Vienna Cabinet, and has agreed to give all the satisfactions asked for. Its answer has been badly presented, in too voluminous a text, accompanied by too many corroborative documents; it constitutes a bulky document, instead of being in short, precise form. It would appear, nevertheless, to be very conclusive. It has been communicated to all the Cabinets interested—yesterday morning to that of Berlin. How comes it that no German newspaper has published it, whilst they almost all reproduced an Austrian telegram declaring that the Serbian answer is quite inadequate? Is not that a new proof of the inflexible resolution, formed both here and at Vienna, to go ahead, at whatever cost?

(Signed) BARON BEYENS.

No. 13.

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, to M. le Baron Beyens, Belgian Minister at Berlin. (Telegraphic.)

Brussels, July 28, 1914.

BE so good as to telegraph if measures have already been taken with a view to the mobilisation of the German army. Keep me informed by telegraph of all that you may learn on this subject.

(Signed) DAVIGNON.

No. 14.

The Belgian Minister, at Berlin, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, July 28, 1914.

I TAKE the opportunity offered me of a safe channel to transmit to you impressions which I would not trust to the post.

The declaration of war by Austro-Hungary on Servia has been judged by public opinion to be an event tending dangerously to compromise the peace of Europe. This is the way in which the Cabinet at Vienna responds to the attempts at conciliation made in London and Petersburg; it breaks down the bridges behind it, so as to prevent all possibility of retreat. There is a fear that this declaration of war may be considered by the Czar as a challenge.

Hostilities are bound then to commence, but they might be of short duration, if Germany would consent to use her influence upon her ally, or if, on their side, the Serbs would yield to the advice given them, and would retire before the invader, without giving him the opportunity to perpetrate any useless bloodshed. By occupying Belgrade, without striking a blow, Austria would have at the same time a moral and material satisfaction and a pledge—both which things would permit of her not showing herself too obdurate. An intervention might then perhaps take place with some chance of success.

Unhappily these are only suppositions inspired by the desire to prevent a European catastrophe. But here is a fact, which might possibly influence the measures taken by the Cabinet of Berlin. Sir Edward Grey declared yesterday to Prince Lichnowsky that if a European war broke out, none of the six Great Powers would be able to keep out of it. At the same time the German papers announced that the British Fleet had been put onto a war footing.

It is certain that these warnings will dissipate an illusion which everyone at Berlin, both in official circles and in the Press, found a pleasure in creating for themselves. Articles in papers, published during these last few days, even after the opening of the conflict, breathed the greatest confidence in the neutrality of England. There can be no doubt that the Imperial Government had reckoned upon it, and that it will have to modify all its calculations. As in 1911, the Berlin Cabinet has been deceived by badly informed agents; to-day, as then, it sees England, in spite of all the advances, in spite of all the diplomatic caresses with which Germany has been lavish these two years past, ready to go over to the camp of its enemies. The reason is that the British statesmen are well aware of the dangers which the absolute hegemony of Germany on the European Continent would entail for their country, and they attach a vital interest, not from sentimental motives, but from considerations of the Balance of Power, to the existence of France as a Great Power.

The German papers to-day at last publish the answer of Serbia to the note of the Austro-Hungarian Government, with the Austrian commentary. Its late appearance is to a large extent the fault of the Serbian Chargé d'Affaires; he had omitted to have the document typewritten in order to send copies to the Press. The impression which it will make in Berlin, where people persist in looking only with the eyes of Austria and where, up till now, with a quite inexplicable compliance, they approve everything which Austria has done, will be practically *nil*.

In your telegram of the 28th inst. you ask me to keep you informed of the measures taken with a view to the mobilisation of the German army. Happily, up till now, we have not to do with mobilisation, in the strict sense. But, as a military attaché said to me yesterday evening, every State before mobilising takes within its territory certain preparatory measures, without exciting attention—recall of officers and men from furlough, purchase of horses for the artillery and ammunition wagons,

which are not completed unless war breaks out, preparation of shells, ammunition, &c. There can be no question that these measures of precaution have been taken in Germany. It is no less necessary to keep a cool head, than it is to be on the alert. We ought to do nothing rash; to recall, at the moment when desperate efforts are being made to preserve peace, three classes of our army would seem here to be premature, and there is a risk of its producing an unfortunate impression.

(Signed) BARON BEYENS.

No. 15.

The Belgian Minister, at Vienna, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister Foreign Affairs. (Telegraphic.)

Vienna, July 30, 1914.

I HAVE to advise you that the negotiations which had taken place at St. Petersburg between the Austrian Ambassador and the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs have been broken off for two days. Mobilisation is proceeding on both sides. The rupture appeared imminent, but after a long and friendly conversation, which took place yesterday between the Russian Ambassador and the Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs, a basis has been found for the resumption of negotiations.

(Signed) COMTE ERREMBAULT DE DUDZEELE.

No. 16.

The Belgian Minister at Vienna to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister Foreign Affairs.

SIR, *Vienna, July* 30*th*, 1914.

MY reports of the last few days have sufficiently shown that I was not successfull in getting precise information as to the intentions of Russia, with regard to which country the Austro-Hungarian press moreover observes, by order, a complete silence. I was wondering whether the Government of the Czar would not maintain an expectant attitude and would ultimately intervene only if Austria-Hungary made what was in their eyes an extravagant use of the victories she was about to gain.

At last, yesterday evening, I succeeded in gathering from a sure source some authentic data.

The situation is almost hopeless, and the Russian Ambassador was expecting at every moment to be recalled. He has made one last effort which has succeeded in warding off the immediate

danger. The conversation of His Excellency with Count Berchtold has been long and absolutely friendly. The Ambassador and the Minister have both recognised that their Governments had given orders for mobilisation, but they parted on good terms.

On leaving the Ballplatz, M. Schebeko repaired to M. Dumaine's, where Sir Maurice de Bunsen was also present. This interview was profoundly moving, and the Russian Ambassador was congratulated warmly by his colleagues on the success which he had gained so cleverly.

The situation continues to be grave, but at any rate the possibility of resuming negotiations has been given, and there is still some hope that all the horrors and all the ruin which a European war would necessarily cause may be avoided.

I am astounded to see with what recklessness and at the same time with what egoism people here have rushed upon an adventure which might have the most terrible consequences for the whole of Europe.

I commit this report to a compatriot recalled to military service, and I take the opportunity, Monsieur le Ministre, of telling you that, whether rightly or wrongly, the Austrian post has the reputation of being indiscreet. Under these conditions, and in view of present circumstances, you will be good enough to excuse me if I sometimes find myself obliged to write less openly than I should like to do.

COMTE ERERENBAULT DE DUDZEELE.

No. 17.

The Belgian Minister at St. Petersburg to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

SIR, *St. Petersburg, July 31st,* 1914.

ON arriving this morning at St. Petersburg I went to see the French Ambassador; M. Paléologue spoke to me to the following effect:—

"The mobilisation is general. So far as France goes, it has not yet been notified, but there can be no doubt as to the fact. M. Sazonof is still negotiating. He is making the utmost efforts to obviate a war and has shown himself ready for all concessions. The German Ambassador has also, personally, worked his hardest in the direction of peace. Count de Pourtalès called on M. Sazonof and entreated him to use his influence with Austria. The Imperial Minister for Foreign Affairs replied to him more than once: 'Give me some means of doing so: cause some word of conciliation to be addressed to me, which makes it possible for me to open conversation with Vienna. Tell your ally to make some concession, however small, to withdraw those points only in the ultimatum which no country could possibly accept.' The German Ambassador has always replied that his country was no longer able to

give any counsels of moderation to Austria. It is probable that at Vienna it is not admitted that the German Empire is lending to its ally anything but an unconditional support."

"More than once," continued M. Paléologue, "the Imperial Minister for Foreign Affairs asked Count de Portalès 'Have you any communication to give me from your Government?' The German Ambassador was obliged to answer on each occasion in the negative, insisting over again that the initiative must come from St. Petersburg. At last M. Sazonof asked for an interview with the Austrian Ambassador, and told him that he accepted everything, either a conference of Ambassadors at London or the conversation 'of Four,' undertaking not to interfere in it, and promising to adopt the opinion of the other Powers. Nothing had any effect; Vienna has consistently refused to discuss: Austria has mobilised eight army corps; she has bombarded Belgrade. Italy, it appears, is to be expected to maintain an attitude of reserve.

"The Russian patriotic press and the military element are both maintaining a notable calm. It would not appear to be the case that any pressure exerted upon the Emperor by his military entourage has determined the attitude of the Russian Government. Confidence is felt in M. Sazonof. It is the extraordinary attitude of Germany which is preventing the efforts of M. Sazonof from having any result."

I have also just had a talk with the British Ambassador. He tells me that M. Sazonof had tried from the outset to ascertain the intentions of the London Government, but, up till now, in spite of the mobilisation of the British Fleet, Sir George Buchanan has not yet been instructed to make any communication of this kind to the Pont des Chantres. The instructions of the Ambassador are to explain to St. Petersburg that if Russia desires the support of Great Britain, it must carefully avoid even the appearance of any aggressive step in the present crisis.

It is no secret to anyone that the Russian means of mobilisation are much slower than those of Austria. Bukovina is named as the point at which the Russian Army might attempt to enter upon Austrian territory.

(Signed) COMTE C. DE BUISSERETT STEENBECQUE DE BLARENGHIEN.

No. 18.

The Belgian Minister at Paris to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

SIR, *Paris, July 31st,* 1914.

I HAVE just had a long conversation with M. de Margerie. He is very much disturbed by the situation. Baron de Schön had promised to communicate the reply given to the overture made in Vienna. He has heard nothing. Nevertheless touch

is being maintained everywhere between the chancelleries; conversations are going on everywhere, but without result.

M. de Margerie gave me the following military information, which I telegraphed to you immediately: Germany is putting her army upon the footing of *Kriegsgefahr*; that implies a notable aggravation of the measures already taken. Russia has taken important decisions, in the matter of its railways. All this does not amount to *mobilisation* in the strict sense, but it comes near to it.

I asked M. de Margerie what the French Government were going to do; he would answer nothing further than that they would not mobilise before Germany, but certain measures might be deemed imperative.

Time does not allow of my writing more. We are being besieged by Belgians recalled to Belgium, by those who seek various kinds of information, &c.

(Signed) BARON GUILLAUME.

No. 19.

The Belgian Minister at Vienna, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

SIR, *Vienna, July 31st*, 1914.

The *Neue Freie Presse* of this evening publishes a telegram from Berlin which, coming immediately after the announcement of general mobilisation, has produced a great sensation. It says that Germany has asked Russia for explanations as to the motives of her mobilisation and that she demands an answer within twenty-four hours.

I went to the British Ambassador's, whom I found very much astonished at the double news. He had no information tending to confirm the latter statement. His Excellency had had this morning a conversation with the second Departmental Chief in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, in the course of which the latter had given him the same comparatively reassuring explanations which Count Berchold had given the evening before to M. Schébéko, declaring especially that the general mobilisation decreed in Austria-Hungary had no aggressive character against Russia.

The question now is, is Germany in her turn going to mobilise? If that were so, the situation would take a turn of extreme gravity, since this measure would, I am assured, be immediately imitated in France.

At the Embassy of the French Republic the prevailing impression this evening is pessimistic, and the staff are making arrangements with a view to a speedy departure, which appears to these gentlemen more and more probable.

I write you these lines in great haste, in order to be able to entrust them to a compatriot who is leaving for Belgium to-night.

(Signed) COMTE ERREMBAULT DE DUDZEELE.

No. 20.

The Belgian Minister at Berlin, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

SIR, *Berlin, August 1st,* 1914.

I TAKE the opportunity of a safe channel in order to write to you and give you certain confidential information as to the latest developments.

At 6 p.m. no answer had yet come from St. Petersburg to the ultimatum from the Imperial Government. Herr von Jagow and Herr Zimmermann went to the Chancellor and to the Emperor, in order to secure that the order for general mobilisation should not be issued to-day, but they were met by the inflexible opposition of the Minister for War and the Chiefs of the Army, who must have represented to the Emperor the fatal consequences of a twenty-four hours' delay. The order was immediately issued and brought to the knowledge of the general public by a special edition of the *Lokal-Anzeiger*. I telegraphed it to you immediately.

The official and semi-official papers, the brief pronouncements of the Emperor and of the Chancellor, and all the official Proclamations which are to appear, will seek to throw the responsibility of the war upon Russia. In governing circles there is still an unwillingness to doubt the good faith of the Emperor; but it is said that he has been got round and skilfully led to believe that he had done all that was necessary for the maintenance of peace, whilst Russia was resolved absolutely on war.

I wrote to you that the Ambassador of the Czar had not received any official confirmation of the general mobilisation in Russia. He was informed of it at 1 o'clock yesterday by Herr von Jagow; but having received no telegram communicating the news to him, he formally threw doubt upon it. Is it possible that Count Pourtalès took for a complete mobilisation what were only preparatory measures of war? Or can it even be that this mistake has been voluntarily made in Berlin? One loses oneself in suppositions.

It was impossible for Russia to accept the German ultimatum presenting as it did so short a time-limit, one almost insulting, and the obligation to demobilise, that is to say, to cease all measures preparatory to war, both on the Austrian and on the German frontiers, at the very time when Austria had mobilised half her forces. As for the Government of the French Republic, they had no intention of returning any answer to Germany, not being bound to give account of their conduct to any save their allies—so the French Ambassador expressed it to me.

With a little good-will on the side of Berlin, peace might have been preserved and the irreparable catastrophe prevented. The day before yesterday the Austrian Ambassador declared to M. Sazonoff that his Government were willing to discuss with him the basis of their note to Serbia; that they undertook to respect the territorial integrity of their adversary, that they did not even cherish any ambition to regain the Sandjak, only they would not allow any other Power to take its place in dealing with Serbia.

M. Sazonof replied that on this basis it was possible to come to an understanding, but that he preferred that the negotiations should be conducted in London under the impartial direction of the British Government rather than at St. Petersburg or at Vienna. At the same time, the Czar and the German Emperor were exchanging friendly telegrams. The German Government seem to have arranged this scenario in order to lead up to the war, which they seek to render inevitable, but the responsibility for which they desire to throw upon Russia.

(Signed) BARON BEYENS.

No. 21.

The Belgian Minister at Paris, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

SIR, *Paris, August 2nd,* 1914.

IN the course of a conversation which I had yesterday evening with M. de Margerie, he said to me: "The situation is certainly very grave, but it would not be considered hopeless if we could have more confidence in the attitude of Germany. The British proposal, by virtue of which the Great Powers would engage to demobilise under certain conditions has been warmly accepted by France, Russia, and Italy; Austria would come into line, but the Berlin Cabinet gives no answer."

The military measures which Germany has taken against Russia are much less severe and less complete than those taken against France. One asks why. I said again to-day to Baron von Schön: "Are you trying to fasten a German quarrel upon us? Relations between the two countries have been good for a fairly long time and there is no incident between us. That being so, why does your Government act in this fashion, if it has no *arrière-pensée*? Why have you yourself been ostentatiously packing up for several days?"

M. de Margerie to whom I had made the communication prescribed in your telegram of the 1st August (see *first Grey Book, No.* 16) has repeated to me what the French Minister told you as to the intentions of the Government of the French Republic with regard to us.

M. de Margerie said to me yesterday evening that it was part of the programme of the French Government not to decree mobilisation before Germany had done so, but that the neighbour on the East was taking measures which were equivalent to a state of mobilisation without pronouncing the word, and that under these conditions the dangers were becoming too great for them to refrain from acting without delay. "All Europe would laugh at our *naiveté*," said he in conclusion of this friendly conversation.

(Signed) BARON GUILLAUME.

No. 22.

The Belgian Minister at Berlin, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

SIR, *Berlin, August 2nd,* 1914.

I HAVE the honour to confirm my telegram of to-day:—

"I have executed the instructions contained in your telegram of yesterday. The Minister for Foreign Affairs thanked me for this communication of which he has kept a copy and taken note (see *First Grey Book, No.* 16)."

I learnt to-day, by the indiscretion of a General Officer, belonging to the Emperor's Household, that Luxemburg would be occupied to-night. Whether it was a question of the Grand Duchy or of our Province, I was not able to elicit clearly. The Grand Duchy was occupied to-day. Will our Province be occupied to-night? If the news is official to-morrow morning, I shall immediately protest to Herr von Jagow and Herr Zimmermann. I shall call their attention to the disastrous consequences of such an action, but I shall wait for your instructions before asking for my passports. I telegraphed to you in my state of uncertainty:

"Rumours portending danger to us. I consider that the Belgian Army ought to be ready immediately for all eventualities."

(Signed) BARON BEYENS.

No. 23.

The Belgian Minister at Vienna to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

SIR, *Vienna, August 2nd,* 1914.

I HAD the honour to receive this morning your telegram of August 1st. (See *First Grey Book, No.* 16.) I immediately communicated with the Imperial and Royal Department for Foreign Affairs, and at 1 o'clock, after having read to the Minister the note with regard to our neutrality which you have addressed to me, I handed a copy of it to His Excellency, which he was good enough to acknowledge.

Count Berchtold expressed his astonishment at Holland having also mobilised. He seemed unable to understand what reasons could have induced the Government of Queen Wilhelmina to take this precautionary measure at the present stage.

(Signed) COUNT ERREMBAULT DE DUDZEELE.

No. 24.

The Belgian Minister at Vienna to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

SIR, *Vienna, August 2nd,* 1915.

THE die appears to have been cast and the universal war seems to have become inevitable. Germany has ordered mobilisation, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs told me an hour ago that Russian patrols had crossed the frontier of the German Empire.

The news, which came yesterday afternoon from Berlin, and the article in the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* have produced a great sensation. The Czar is reproached in lively terms in that he asked the intervention of the German Emperor in favour of the maintenance of peace, giving his word that the mobilisation would not take place, and then proceeded all the same with this operation, whilst attempting to keep it secret. Viennese papers declare that such a way of acting is unworthy, that it is playing the part of a traitor, and it is now proclaimed more loudly than ever that if the war becomes general Russia alone will be to blame.

Following upon the assassination of M. Jaurès, a rumour was spread here yesterday evening that a revolution had broken out in Paris and that the President of the Republic had been killed. The French Ambassador, whom I saw at 11 o'clock, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who received me at 1 o'clock, had had no confirmation of this news, no doubt circulated by those who hoped that the French Socialists would oppose the war. On the contrary, the news has come that France in its turn has mobilised.

Vienna is very much preoccupied about the decision which England will take. From the conversations which I have had during these last few days with Sir Maurice de Bunsen, I imagine that, after having kept up their efforts for conciliation till the last minute, the English Government will maintain at the outset a waiting attitude. This is what Count Berchtold also told me to-day.

Public opinion here counts much upon England standing completely out, and the newspapers are continually publishing articles calculated to corroborate this view. I am afraid that on this matter they labour under too many illusions. The Ambassador said to be the day before yesterday: "No one in England can yet say at this moment what we are going to do. We shall be guided by events, but we should not allow France to be crushed without intervening."

(Signed) COMTE ERREMBAULT DE DUDZEELE.

No. 25.

The Belgian Minister at Berlin to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegraphic.)

Berlin, August 5th, 1914.

I WAS received this morning at 9 o'clock by the Minister for Foreign Affairs. He said to me: "We have been obliged by absolute necessity to address to your Government the request of which you are aware. For Germany it is a matter of life and death. In order not to be crushed, she has first to crush France and then turn against Russia. We have learnt that the French Army was preparing to pass through Belgium, in order to attack our flank. We are bound to forestall it. If the Belgian army abstains from blowing up the bridges, allows us to occupy Liège and retires upon Antwerp, we promise, not only to respect the independence of Belgium, the life and property of its inhabitants, but also to pay you an indemnity. It is only with the utmost anguish (*la mort dans l'âme*) that the Emperor and the Government have seen themselves obliged to come to this decision. For me it is the most painful one that I have ever had to make in the course of my career."

I answered that the Belgian Government could only return to this proposition the reply which they had made without hesitation. What would you say of us, if we yielded to a similar threat on the part of France? That we were cowards, unable to defend our neutrality and to live in independence. All Belgium will approve the action of its Government. France, in spite of what you say, has promised to respect our neutrality, if you respect it.

In return for our loyalty, you make Belgium the field of battle between France and yourselves. Europe will judge you, and you will have against you England, the guarantor of our neutrality. Liège is not quite so easy to take as you imagine."

The Minister for Foreign Affairs, when pressed by me, acknowledged that we could not have replied to the German demand otherwise than we had done, and that he understood our answer. He repeated more than once the expression of his grief that it had come to this. "It is," he said, "a question of life-and-death for Germany."

I answered that a people, like an individual, cannot live without honour. I then declared myself ready to leave Berlin with my staff.

Herr von Jagow answered that he did not wish to break off diplomatic relations with us.

I said: "It rests with my Government to make a decision, and I await their orders before asking you for my passports."

(Signed) BARON BEYENS.

No. 26.

The Belgian Minister in London to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

SIR, *London, August 5th,* 1914.

YOU will perhaps be interested to know the views of the French Embassy on the situation, and I think it is worth while for me to give you a summary of the conversations which I have had during these last few days with Monsieur de Fleuriau, Councillor of the Embassy:—

The French concentration begins to-day, and has been arranged to take place behind the covering troops which are massed upon the frontier. The Generalissimo is absolutely decided, if necessary, to allow the troops of the first line to be crushed, in order to leave time for the army to take up the positions which have been assigned to it in the strategic plan, in which the Generalissimo does not intend to make any modification. Only the event of the British army not co-operating would oblige him to extend the French left. That is why M. Cambon is exerting himself at the present moment to obtain from the British Government a speedy decision as to the despatch of a British expeditionary force to the Continent. This would require from twelve to fifteen days to be in a position to take part in the military operations. Everything is ready, the Councillor of Embassy repeated to me, for the transport of British troops to the French ports, and thence to the Belgian frontier. "But we must act quickly, because it would never do for the British to arrive after it is too late."

M. Cambon, in an interview which he had yesterday with Sir Edward Grey, begged him to note that England had decided to go to war because Belgian neutrality had been violated. "But how will you carry on war," he said, "if the German fleet, as appears very likely, refuses battle and remains in the Baltic? You ought then to send the expeditionary corps to the Continent immediately."

Sir Edward Grey did not answer, but perhaps the decisive refusal of Germany to respect Belgian neutrality will give the Cabinet in London food for thought, and will enlighten it as to German tactics, which consist in acting with an overwhelming rapidity and in adopting the most daring plans.

I learn that Sweden and Norway have promised Russia, France and England to remain neutral.

My telegram of to-night asserted that it was Germany which had declared war on England. This information was first telephoned to me from the Foreign Office and then confirmed by a circular letter. But shortly afterwards the Minister for Foreign Affairs took pains to rectify this version, which represented the matter somewhat incorrectly, and he supplied me with the following communication:—

> "A summary refusal having been given by the German Government to the British demand for an assurance concerning the respect of Belgian neutrality, His Majesty's

Ambassador at Berlin has received his passports, and the British Government has announced to the Imperial Government that a state of war existed between the two countries as from 11 p.m. on August 4th."

I have summed up this second version in my telegram of to-day.

I remain,

(Signed) COMTE DE LALAING.

No. 27.

The Belgian Minister at London to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

SIR, *London, August 5th,* 1914.

I HAVE handed in to Sir Edward Grey Belgium's appeal to the three Guaranteeing Powers. Great Britain will naturally answer it warmly. Sir Edward will read to-day in the House of Commons a despatch of this morning from Sir F. Villiers containing the text of that appeal. The fine resistance of Belgium, said the Minister to me, will render easier the task of the British Cabinet with regard to public opinion. Great Britain will help you with all her might. Sir Edward Grey told me that you had asked him to assure the provisioning of Antwerp by way of the Scheldt, and that he had for that reason asked the Dutch Minister to come to see him soon, to whom he will explain that for Belgium this is necessary under the circumstances, and that he did not expect any difficulties concerning the free passage of mercantile vessels. In any case the British First Lord of the Admiralty has told Sir Edward Grey that Belgium could rely on it that the British fleet will keep good guard at the mouth of the Scheldt.

I remain,

(Signed) COMTE DE LALAING.

No. 28.

The Belgian Minister at Paris to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegraphic.)

Paris, August 6th, 1914.

I HAVE urged at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs that French military action should be accelerated. I was answered that considerable forces have already gone; several detachments are already in Belgium.

(Signed) BARON GUILLAUME.

No. 29.

The Belgian Minister at London to M. Davignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

London, August 7th, 1914.

I HAVE the honour to confirm the fact that Parliament has voted £100,000,000 war credits and a levy of 500,000 men.

The French and Russian Ambassadors have come to congratulate the King's Minister on the heroic conduct of the Belgian Army, which, by delaying the advance of the Germans, compelled them to modify their original plans, and allowed the enemies of Germany time to concentrate their forces for the general defence.

The despatch of the Expeditionary Force is being actively prepared. The first transports with provisions and ammunition will leave for France on Sunday, August 9th. The troops will then be embarked, and it is expected that by the end of next week, that is, about August 15th, the 100,000 men of the Expeditionary Force will assemble on French soil; according to what I have been told by the French Ambassador the landing is to be effected at four different points, after which the troops are to be assembled.

The Prime Minister analysed yesterday in the House of Commons the Blue Book which I had the honour to send you on August 6th. He has branded the insidious proposals made to Great Britain by Germany with a view to obtaining her neutrality.

"Besides matters concerning France and Holland," said Mr. Asquith, "they wanted us to barter away to the Imperial Government our obligations towards Belgium, and that without her knowledge. Had we accepted those *infamous* proposals, what reply could we have given to-day to the moving appeal which that country has addressed to us, when she asked us in these last few days to guarantee her neutrality? I do not envy the man who can read with an unmoved heart the appeal of the King of the Belgians to his people. Sir, Belgians are fighting and losing their lives. Had we listened to Germany and betrayed our friends and our duty, what would now be our position? In return for our dishonour we would have received promises from a Power which not only has violated its own promises but asks you to do the same. We are going to fight, first of all in order to fulfil our international obligations, secondly in defence of the small nations. The country will understand that our cause is just, and I ask the House to vote a credit of £100,000,000 and to increase the army to 500,000 men."

The House voted the war credits and the men in the same sitting.

Public opinion has moved at last and the change has come in a most startling way. Europe had realised that a small nation has given an example of honour and honesty without considering the consequences. The adherents of peace at any price were beaten. Then, people learned that the enemy had crossed the frontier, that fighting had begun, and that the Belgians had resisted the German colossus. The speech of our King was read, everyone at last realised the seriousness of the situation, and even

the most pacific Englishman has scrutinised his conscience. He said to himself, " Can we abandon a nation which gives us such an example of loyalty? " Then came the news of the German atrocities and of the heroic defence of Liége. That was decisive. The whole of England asked for war, and was no longer satisfied with the naval support which the Cabinet favoured at first. The sending of the Expeditionary Force was demanded. The Government waited to be given that order by the people. It obeyed. Two Ministers who differed resigned office, and their resignations were immediately accepted. Lord Kitchener was appointed Secretary of State for War, and mobilisation was ordered.

To-day the admiration of this country for Belgium has no limit. In the military clubs the health of the brave Belgians is drunk, newspapers of all shades praise our nation. We are receiving numbers of congratulatory letters and telegrams. If the King came over here, he would be carried in triumph through the streets of London.

I have opened a subscription for the families of the Belgian soldiers, and for the sick and wounded of our army; Her Grace the Duchess of Vendôme is its Honorary President, and I shall hold the funds at your disposal.

I am, &c.,

(Signed) COMTE DE LALAING.

No. 30.

The Belgian Minister at Paris to M. Davignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

SIR, *Paris, August 8th,* 1914.

THE President of the Republic has done me the honour to announce that he conferred the Legion of Honour on the town of Liége. I thought this a good opportunity for seeing him, and have asked for an interview in order to thank him. He received me and the interview lasted three-quarters of an hour, and only ended when the Minister for Foreign Affairs asked to speak to him.

He did not want to accept my thanks, declaring that it was he who had to thank me and to congratulate me. I did not hide from him my view that France owed to us the value of four days' delay in the German mobilisation. He is convinced of that. I pass over all the flattering things which he said to me about our country and our valiant army.

The French army is in Belgium; but those are only the vanguard; before four days are passed the bulk of the French army will be at our side. He expects that the French army has already joined battle with the Germans on our territory. The English will also be soon at the front; they need about four more days. A hundred thousand men will land and will be joined by another fifty thousand.

(Signed) BARON GUILLAUME.

No. 31.

The Belgian Minister at Paris to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Paris, August 10th, 1914.

THE day before yesterday I asked for and obtained an interview with the President of the Republic to thank him for having conferred the Legion of Honour on the town of Liége. I have sent you account of that interview. I could not take a similar step to-day on the occasion of the Military Cross being conferred on the King. I, therefore, abstained.

M. de Margerie has just told me that the Austrian Ambassador will leave Paris to-night. It is not yet announced, in order to avoid demonstrations. M. Doumergue told him during the day that as the explanations given by his Government concerning the movements of troops towards the French frontier were not considered satisfactory, M. Dumaine had received orders to return to Paris. Count Szecsen answered that, in these circumstances, he asked for his passports.

(Signed) BARON GUILLAUME.

No. 32.

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Count Errembault de Dudzeele, Belgian Minister at Vienna. (Telegraphic.)

Brussels, August 12th, 1914.

PLEASE communicate the following note to the Minister for Foreign Affairs:—

"The necessities of the defence of Antwerp give the military authorities an incontestable right to remove strangers from the fortified district. A great number of foreigners and even of nationals have consequently been asked to leave the place where Austrian and Hungarian subjects have been able to remain. Nevertheless, the Consul-General did not telegraph on the subject either to the Austro-Hungarian Minister or to me. I am told by the Military Governor of Antwerp that the Consul-General was warned to be prepared to leave the fortified district (but not Belgium), just as were his compatriots in his district. At his own request he was conducted to the Dutch frontier, and he was accompanied by an officier whom he thanked."

(Signed) DAVIGNON.

No. 33.

The Belgian Minister at Vienna to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

SIR, *Vienna, August 18th,* 1914.

I HAD the honour to speak to Count Forgach about the alleged hardship inflicted on Austro-Hungarian subjects in Belgium. Our conversation was conducted in a friendly manner, and the words of His Excellency can be summed up as follows:—

"Our Consul-General at Antwerp arrived here a few days ago. He says that he has been sent in a discourteous manner, and under disagreeable circumstances, to the Dutch frontier, with many Germans and Austrians resident at Antwerp. The military Commander of the fortress seems rather to have lost his head. We have received from our Minister at Brussels a report concerning those events which seems to confirm the statements of Herr von Sponer."

I think that the regrettable incident can, fortunately, be considered as closed.

(Signed) COUNT ERREMBAULT DE DUDZEELE.

No. 34.

Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers at London, Paris, and St. Petersburg. (Telegraphic.)

August 21st, 1914.

THE British Minister has been authorised to make the following declaration to the King:—

"His Majesty's Government will give during the war all possible military support to Belgium and, after the war, its diplomatic support. The example of patriotism given by the Belgians has impressed us all and will never be forgotten. At the conclusion of peace, the Government will do its best to get for Belgium compensation for the sufferings through which she had passed."

(Signed) DAVIGNON.

No. 35.

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Belgian Minister at Vienna. (Telegraphic.)

Antwerp, August 22nd, 1914.

ALL measures have been taken to secure that no Austrian subject should be molested. The President of the Council has himself asked the Austrian Minister to let him know of any regrettable incident so that the guilty might be punished.

(Signed) DAVIGNON.

No. 36.

The Russian Minister in Belgium to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

SIR, *Antwerp, August 27th*, 1914.

I HAVE the honour to inform you of the following:—

"His Majesty the Emperor has been pleased to order me to declare to His Majesty the King that at the end of the war, Belgium may count on the fullest diplomatic support of Russia."

(Signed) PRINCE KOUDACHEFF.

No. 37.

The Belgian Minister at London to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

SIR, *London, August 28th*, 1914.

THE day before yesterday, Mr. Asquith announced to the House of Commons that at the next sitting an address to His Majesty the King will be moved, asking him to transmit to the King of the Belgians the sentiments of sympathy and admiration with which the House has been inspired by the heroic resistance offered by the Belgian army and nation to the brutal invasion of its territory, and the assurance that Great Britain was determined to support by every means the efforts of Belgium to defend her independence and the public law of Europe.

Yesterday, in fact, Mr. Asquith delivered a speech in the House in which he rendered signal homage to the Belgian King and Nation. Never has similar praise of a foreign State been heard in the English Parliament. The Prime Minister added that Belgium can count on Great Britain to the very end.

Mr. Bonar Law, in the name of the Opposition, and Mr. Redmond, in the name of the Irish Nationalists, spoke in the same sense.

In the House of Lords, the Marquis of Crewe, in the name of the Government, and Lord Lansdowne, as spokesman of the Unionists, warmly praised Belgium and her King.

Time does not allow me to sum up these speeches, the tribute of England's gratitude to a country which has rendered an inestimable service to Great Britain and to the whole of Europe.

(Signed) COUNT DE LALAING.

No. 38.

M. Davignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Prince Koudacheff, Russian Minister in Belgium.

SIR, *Antwerp, August* 29, 1914.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter of August 27th, in which Your Excellency kindly informed me that His Majesty, the Emperor of Russia, had asked Your Excellency to assure my august Sovereign that, after the war, Belgium will be able to count on the diplomatic support of His Government.

I thank Your Excellency for that gracious communication.

(Signed) DAVIGNON.

No. 39.

M. Davignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers at London, Paris, and St. Petersburg.

SIR, *Antwerp, August* 29, 1915.

UNDER date of August 26th, the Vice-Governor of Katanga telegraphed to the Minister for the Colonies that on August 22nd the Germans attacked the harbour of Lukuga (Albertville) on Lake Tanganika.

My colleague, M. Renkin, addressed, on August 28th, the following instructions to M. Tonbeur:

"In view of the direct attacks by the Germans against the colony of the Belgian Congo, and specially against the harbour of Lukuga, the Government instructs you to take all necessary military measures for the defence of Belgian territory.

"You may therefore authorise the entry of British troops into Belgian territory, accept the offer of a free passage for Belgian troops into Rhodesia, and undertake in co-operation with British troops, or by means of Belgian troops alone, any offensive action required for the defence of the integrity of our colonial territory.

"Identical instructions have been addressed to the Governor-General of the Congo, at Boma, regarding a possible co-operation with the French troops on our frontier in the Basin of the Ubanghi for similar defensive measures."

I have communicated to the ministers of France, Great Britain, and Russia the telegram of the Vice-Governor of Katanga and the answer sent to him.

(Signed) DAVIGNON.

(Cf. *First Grey Book, No.* 57.)

No. 40.

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Baron Grenier, Belgian Minister at Madrid. (Telegraphic.)

Antwerp, August 30th, 1914.

THE Viennese newspapers, especially the *Neue Freie Presse*, publish alleged accounts by German and Austrian subjects expelled from Belgium, stating that our population committed the greatest atrocities against them under the eyes of the Belgian authorities. A man called Weber is alleged to have been massacred by the mob at Antwerp, whilst at Ostend the baker Bichof is alleged to have been beaten to death, and his hands and feet cut off.

The Government protest indignantly against these accusations, and formally deny that outrages were committed on the persons of German or Austro-Hungarian subjects. With the exception of the breaking of the furniture of some coffee-houses, the perpetrators of which have been severely punished, no German or Austrian property has been damaged.

Please ask the Spanish Government to transmit our protest to the Austro-Hungarian Government.

(Signed) DAVIGNON.

No. 41.

The Belgian Minister at Luxembourg to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

SIR, *Antwerp, August 30th,* 1914.

YOU asked me for an account of the conditions under which I was obliged to leave my post at Luxembourg, although the most friendly relations still existed between the Grand Duchy and Belgium.

On Saturday, August 8th, at 3 p.m., M. Eyschen came himself to hand to me the letter of which I enclose a copy, together with a copy of a letter which he had received from Herr von Buch, the German Minister (see *First Grey Book, No.* 66.)

Saying how much he regretted to have to perform such a mission, the Minister of State asked me to let him know my intentions as soon as possible.

I immediately addressed to His Excellency the answer given below:

" SIR, *Luxembourg, August 8th,* 1914.

" YOUR Excellency has just given me notice that the German military authorities demand my departure.

" Whatever the courtesy with which the communication was delivered, I must bow before a wish which is nothing but the expression of force.

" Your Excellency's letter says that the military authorities advise me to travel by railway rather than by motor car. I conform to that suggestion, and I am prepared to leave Luxembourg to-morrow, at the hour which will be indicated to me, and

to go by train to Coblentz, provided however, that from there I may be authorised to return immediately to Belgium by whatever route may seem possible, and that diplomatic immunities be guaranteed to me whilst on the territory of the Empire.

"I cannot cease to take an interest in the fate and security of the numerous Belgians who inhabit the Grand Duchy, and I ask Your Excellency kindly to take measures for their protection, as well as for care of the building of the Legation.

"It is especially painful for me to have to leave the territory of Luxembourg without having offered my most respectful homage to Her Royal Highness the Grand Duchess in acknowledgment of the kind reception which the Sovereign to whom I had the honour of being accredited has always been pleased to give to me. I hope that Your Excellency will kindly express my regrets.

"Taking the opportunity of repeating to you, Sir, my most sincere thanks for the very friendly way in which you have, in all circumstances, been at pains to facilitate my mission,

"I remain, &c.,

"(Signed) COMTE F. VAN DEN STEEN DE JEHAY."

Having again seen Herr von Buch, M. Eyschen came back to tell me that the Officer then Commanding Luxembourg could not give any undertaking except for the journey from Luxembourg to Coblentz, and that in that town it would fall to General von Ploetz to instruct me as to what I shall have to do. Such an answer did not seem satisfactory to me, and I declared that under these circumstances I would remain at my post whatever should happen.

Thereupon it was decided to ask at Berlin for instructions.

On Sunday, August 9th, at 9.30 a.m., M. Eyschen came personally and brought me a passport conforming entirely to the wishes which I had expressed. It was signed by the German Minister, and by the General Commanding the 8th Army Corps. A saloon carriage was put at my disposal, and the train which I was asked to take was to leave at 12.18 p.m.

Her Royal Highness the Grand Duchess kindly sent to the station her Chamberlain and Secretary, M. de Colnet d'Huart, to bid me farewell; he told me that he was sent to transmit to me as well as to my wife the farewell of the Grand Duchess, and to assure me of the very sincere way in which Her Royal Highness sympathised with our feelings. There were also at the station M. Eyschen and Major van Dyck, A.D.C. of the Grand Duchess and commander of the armed forces.

The line being blocked by military trains, the journey proceeded slowly, but without any incident. At Trèves, an A.D.C. of the General commanding the town came to ask me very politely whether I had any wish to express. The same happened at Coblentz. I was brought by a special train to Granemburg, the last station of the German railway system on the line Clève-Nimegue.

I remain, &c.,

(Signed) COMTE F. VAN DEN STEEN DE JEHAY.

No. 42.

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to all the Heads of Belgian Missions abroad.

SIR, *Antwerp, September 4th, 1914.*

THE German and Austrian press is spreading through the whole world the most misleading rumours concerning the attitude of the population of our large towns towards the German and Austrian subjects resident in Belgium at the beginning of the present war. A considerable number of them are said to have been molested, women and children to have suffered the worst outrages; at the cemetery of Antwerp the German graves are said to have been plundered.

The Cabinets of Berlin and Vienna, after having published these alleged acts of hostility on the part of our population in the official and semi-official press, have invoked them as a justification, the one for the atrocities committed by the German troops in our country, the other for its declaration of war against Belgium.

In order to throw full light on those allegations the Royal Government has ordered the most minute enquiry into the subject and this has been carried out with the greatest impartiality by the Court of first instance at Antwerp.

You will find enclosed the report addressed by the *Procureur du Roi* on this subject to the *Procureur-General* of the Court of Appeal.

As you will see, the population of Antwerp has pillaged certain coffee-houses and shops belonging to Germans and Austrians, but it has not committed any act of aggression against their persons and no damage has been committed on German graves, which remain at present as well looked after as before the war.

Please bring this report to the knowledge of the Government to which you are accredited and communicate it to the press.

I remain, &c.,

(Signed) DAVIGNON.

Appendix to No. 42.

Court of First Instance at Antwerp. No. 81,909.

Antwerp, August 25th, 1914.

To the *Procureur-General.*

SIR,

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you this report on the events which occurred on August 4th and 5th last, after the population had learned of the determination of Germany to invade our territory, concerning which there recently appeared in the *Kölnische Zeitung* an account wholly at variance with the facts.

At the news of the imminent invasion, the population became very much excited, and its irritation was increased by the fact that German and Austrian subjects had always been treated in our town with the greatest regard and the greatest friendship. The anger of the people was such that in the afternoon of August 4th huge bands of demonstrators began to move through the different parts of the town, singing the *Brabançone*, and hooting in front of the shops and houses occupied by German subjects.

The demonstrators, among whom were many young people, began by pulling down German flags in various places, including the German school in the Rue Quellin.

Towards night the bands constantly increased in numbers, and soon a considerable number of small retail shops and public-houses owned by Germans were pillaged, the windows smashed, and the furniture thrown into the street and trampled upon.

Certain evil-doers did not miss the opportunity of appropriating the belongings of other people.

The police and the civic guard intervened as promptly as possible and order was soon re-established; but the demonstrations had broken out so suddenly, and simultaneously at so many different points, that it was physically impossible to prevent a certain amount of destruction and even some thefts.

Numerous arrests were, however, made, and I felt it my duty to ask for warrants of arrest in all cases which seemed in the least serious. The breaches of the law were made at once the object of a thorough investigation and the guilty persons brought before the competent courts with as much despatch as possible.

I got in touch with the President of the Court of my department in order urgently to arrange for extraordinary hearings, so as to be able to secure prompt suppression.

Enclosed I have the honour to send you a complete list of cases sent for trial, both those which have been tried and those in which the investigation has not yet been completed.

In certain serious cases, the Court has rightly considered it its duty to show severity against certain hooligans who were fishing in troubled waters.

For the reason given above it was impossible for the representatives of public force to determine the identity of the pillagers, as on the arrival of the police or civic guard, they at once plunged into the crowd.

With the exception which I shall specify below, no one has been beaten or wounded, and all foreigners have remained absolutely unharmed as far as their persons are concerned.

The only wounded are two Belgian subjects who were spectators of one of the demonstrations of August 5th.

At the corner of the Rue Artevelde, a coffee house leased to a German was attacked by a band of rioters when suddenly five or six revolver shots were fired from the interior of the establishment. A certain Isenbaert and a certain Simons, Belgian subjects, the two spectators mentioned above, were struck by the revolver bullets, one in the right arm, the other in the head; the latter was not a serious wound, the bullet having passed between

the skull and the scalp. The perpetrator of that crime was himself also a Belgian subject, a certain Meeus, brother-in-law of the German lessee.

Mr. Justice Denis is charged with the investigation of the case of Meeus.

As to the violation of the cemetery, there is only one cemetery at Antwerp namely the great necropolis of Kiel, which lies about five kilometres away from the place where the riots occurred.

As appears from the Report No. 900 of the Ninth Section, enclosed herewith, no damage was done to the graves of the Germans or to those of any others who were there buried. The graves of the German subjects have remained completely intact and are still at the present moment kept in repair and decorated with flowers as they have always been.

It ought to be noted that the damage done in the public houses has been, as a rule, only partly to the prejudice of the German tenants. As a matter of fact, almost all these premises belong to brewers, as in most cases does also the furniture of the business part of the public houses. So true is this that several civil actions for damages and indemnities have already been brought by the brewers before the jurisdiction of the Court of my Department.

Attorney-General,

(Signed) JACOBS.

No. 43.

The Belgian Minister at Constantinople to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

SIR, *Constantinople, September 7th,* 1914.

SINCE I had the honour of announcing to you my return to Constantinople on 16th August, I have addressed to you no political despatch, finding myself without any means of transmitting one to you.

I entrust the present letter to a special messenger of the French Embassy, in the hope that it will reach you.

On my return here, I found the situation very strained. The incident of the *Goeben* had just taken place.

The German Ambassador, all-powerful here, to the extent that the Ottoman ministers fairly frequently hold their Council meetings at his house, used all his efforts to push the Turks into an imprudent step, which might provoke war with the powers of the Triple Entente.

At this moment, Talaat Bey and Halil Bey, President of the Chamber, had just left for Sofia and Bucharest with the object, they said, of settling the question of the islands with Greece. But the real aim of their journey was to feel the ground with a view to constituting a compact group (*un bloc*), which might engage in war against Russia.

They were soon able to assure themselves that this attempt had no chance of success, and it was at that moment that I had the honour of telegraphing to you that the Ambassadors of the Triple Entente were beginning to hope that the complication of a war with Turkey would not supervene.

Since then the situation has gone through different phases and more than once has looked dangerous.

Baron de Wangenheim, and especially General Liman von Sanders, are doing all they can to incite the Turks to war, and they have succeeded in creating here an absolutely German atmosphere in Ottoman circles.

A week ago a rupture appeared probable. The Government not only did not send back the German crews of the *Goeben* and the *Breslau*, but hundreds of sailors and artillerymen were seen arriving from Germany, to serve both in the naval forces and in the batteries guarding the Straits.

The moment therefore appeared near, when the sense of national dignity would oblige the three Allied Powers to put a limit to the provocations of Turkey. Their Ambassadors then began to prepare for departure and I had the honour of informing you of this by telegraph, adding that in the event of my receiving my passports myself, I proposed to entrust the protection of the Belgians residing in Turkey to the Ambassador of the United States.

But in consequence of energetic representations made on August 30th to the Grand Vizier, the situation has seemed to clear up somewhat. His Highness is personally in favour of peace. The same may be said of several members of the Cabinet, amongst others Djavid Bey, who sees the abyss into which the finances of the State will be hurled.

Unhappily the power of Enver Pasha is still very great and he would like to launch the country into the maddest adventures at any cost.

The mobilisation which has taken place under his orders far surpassed in rigour that which took place during the Balkan War. This time, nobody is excepted between the ages of 20 and 45. Requisitions have assumed a character of a veritable spoilation. The military authorities not only require the provisions to be delivered to them which are found in the shops of private owners or at the Customs House, but also goods of every kind, from motor-cars to ladies' toilet articles.

Numerous boats coming from the Black Sea and going past on their way to the Mediterranean, have been stopped at the passage and unloaded by force.

These proceedings, which the Minister of a foreign Power has not hesitated to term piracy, in a note which he addressed to the Porte, have, as their result, made trading ships desert the Bosphorus.

I learn that the receipts of the customs at Constantinople have diminished by more than 75 per cent. As to tithes, they will amount to practically nothing, according to what I was told by a member of the Council of Debt. On the one hand, the harvest has been gathered in under adverse conditions, in consequence

of lack of labour; on the other hand, the military authorities have seized a mass of agricultural produce, before there was opportunity for the tithe to be levied.

It will be possible for the September coupons of the Public Unified Debt to be paid, but that will probably not be the case with the following coupon, and, for the first time since the Decree of Muharram, a suspension of the service of the Public Debt will be seen, whilst the deficit, according to the British Delegate on the Council of the Debt, will reach the figure of £T16,500,000.

It is not surprising that under these conditions Djavid Bey, as Minister of Finance, is exerting himself to stop the Government on the fatal incline, down which German influence and the chauvinism of Enver Pasha wish to drag them.

For the moment, it is especially war against Greece which is contemplated. As I was told yesterday by an Ambassador, the Hellenic Government are well aware that they can no longer hold without question all that was assigned to them by the Treaty of London. The European situation has changed and they will have to make some concessions. Athens would be willing to make concessions with regard to the government in Chios and Mytilene; for instance, it would be prepared to recognise the suzerainty of the Sultan over these islands. But the Turks, in accordance with their system of bargaining, are now formulating on this head such demands that it seems difficult for an understanding to be reached.

There are, nevertheless, various reasons which lead one to believe at present that Turkey will not decide to open hostilities against Greece.

Turkey could not attack Greece by sea, since England has given it to be understood that if the Goeben or the Breslau comes out of the Dardanelles, the British squadron has orders to sink them.

As to a campaign on land, that would need the consent of Bulgaria, and certain signs seem to indicate that there is little disposition at Sofia to yield an assistance which might involve the country in grave complications.

All the Ambassadors at Constantinople are, in fact, convinced that a rupture between Turkey and Greece will inevitably lead to a war with the three great allied Powers.

To sum up, the danger has diminished, but it is far from having disappeared. The Powers of the Triple Entente are doing their best to remove it, but German influence may bring things to such a pass that the dignity of the three allied countries will be compromised.

Finally, if war breaks out, this will mean political, as well as economic, ruin for Turkey, since the persons most competent to speak are of the opinion that the Turkish army is incapable of taking the field.

(Signed) Baron GUILLAUME.

No. 44.

His Majesty the King of the Belgians to the President of the French Republic. (Telegraphic.)

Antwerp, September 13th, 1914.

THE great victory which the allied army has just gained, thanks to its bravery and to the military genius of its leaders, has given us profound joy.

In addressing to you my warmest congratulations I speak for the whole Belgian people.

We keep an unshakable confidence in the final success of the struggle, and the abominable cruelties which our people has suffered, far from intimidating us, as was hoped, serve only to increase the energy and ardour of our troops.

(Signed) ALBERT.

No. 45.

His Majesty the King of the Belgians to His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. (Telegraphic.)

Antwerp, September 13th, 1914.

I WISH to congratulate you very cordially on the superb conduct of the English troops in the Battle of the Marne. In the name of the Belgian nation I express to you our profoundest admiration for the dauntless courage of the officers and soldiers of your army.

God will certainly help our armies to avenge the atrocities committed upon peaceable citizens and against a country whose only crime has been that it refused to be false to its engagements.

(Signed) ALBERT.

No. 46.

His Majesty the King of the Belgians to His Majesty the Emperor of Russia. (Telegraphic.)

Antwerp, September 13th, 1914.

THE magnificent victory which the troops of your Majesty have just gained fills us, both the Belgian people and myself, with sincere admiration for the courage of the Russian soldiers and the talent of their leaders. It is with all my heart that I address to Your Majesty my warmest congratulations.

The cruelties which the country is suffering so unjustly do not at all deject it, and its ardour grows at the thought of the innumerable armies of Your Imperial Majesty advancing triumphantly, uniting their efforts to those of the victorious troops of the friendly Powers who are fighting valiantly in France.

(Signed) ALBERT.

No. 47.

The President of the French Republic to His Majesty the King of the Belgians. (Telegraphic.)

Bordeaux, September 14th, 1914.

I RETURN Your Majesty lively thanks for the congratulations which you have been good enough to address to the leaders and soldiers of the French army. Our troops are proud of fighting side by side with the valiant armies of Belgium and England for civilisation and for liberty. When the hour of remedial justice strikes no one will be able to forget what Your Majesty and the admirable Belgian people have done for the triumph of the common cause.

(Signed) RAYMOND POINCARÉ.

No. 48.

His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland to His Majesty the King of the Belgians. (Telegraphic.)

London, September 14th, 1914.

I THANK you most sincerely for your kind telegram and for your appreciation of the services of my troops. I earnestly trust that the combined operations of the allied forces in co-operation with your brave army, whose heroic efforts are beyond all praise, will meet with continued success and will free your much-tried country from the invader.

(Signed) GEORGE V.

No. 49.

His Majesty the Emperor of Russia to His Majesty the King of the Belgians. (Telegraphic.)

Tsarskoy-Selo, September 14th, 1914.

TOUCHED by the congratulations of Your Majesty, I thank you very cordially and take pleasure in calling to mind on this occasion that in the present contest it was Belgium who first opposed a heroic resistance to the invaders. The noble attitude of the Belgian people and of its valiant army, led to glory by its King, has evoked the admiration of the whole world. As a testimony of this admiration, which I share with all Russia, I beg Your Majesty to accept the Cross of Chevalier of my Military Order of St. George, which is not given to any but the brave.

(Signed) NICOLAS.

No. 50.

The Belgian Minister at Vienna to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

SIR, *Berne, September 16th,* 1914.

IT was on the evening of August 27th that the Minister of Foreign Affairs, after making use of certain not very lucid phrases as to acts of barbarity alleged to have been committed upon Austro-Hungarian subjects in Belgium, announced to me the rupture of our relations.

What was the determining motive which led to this change of attitude in regard to us?

Was it the fact that the Austro-Hungarian Minister of War has placed at the disposal of the German military authorities a certain number of siege guns of 30·5 calibre, mounted on motors, constructed in the works of the "Skoda" Society at Pilsen (Bohemia) and served by Austro-Hungarian gunners?

Was it the desire to have ground for an eventual demand, to be put forward at the conclusion of peace, for a war indemnity?

Was it the feeling that they must satisfy public opinion, which had been strongly excited against us by the extremely violent language of the press?

Was it finally a yielding to pressure exercised by the German Embassy?

I imagine that it was a combination of all these motives which provoked this decision.

I have been assured from a good source that a certain number of the guns, whose manufacture I mentioned in one of my reports last winter, without being then able to give the precise figure of their calibre, have been sent to France and Belgium.

In one of the conversations which I had had with Count Forgach, the latter had spoken to me of numerous Jewish tradesmen and diamond-cutters from Galicia having been completely ruined in consequence of their summary expulsion from the *Place* of Antwerp. His Excellency had not concealed from me that certain demands for compensation would be advanced on this head.

The Austrian journals have not only published numerous letters, duly signed, coming from travellers who complain of having undergone bad treatment in Belgium, but they have reproduced all the German accusations with regard to cruelties and atrocities alleged to have been perpetrated by our people during the course of the conflict. It is evidently the disagreeable realisation of the wrong they have committed in violating our neutrality, and the lively desire, if not to efface, at any rate to weaken, the bad impression produced by those proceedings against the rights of peoples, which have prompted this particularly bitter campaign against us.

"We thought the Belgians possessed of a high civilisation and culture, and now we see they are worse than Serbians, worse than the negroes of the Congo." This is the dominant note. Further, with reference to the violation of our neutrality and on the subject of the political side of the question, the most

serious papers, such as the *Neue Freie Presse* and the *Fremdenblatt* itself, have published articles containing arguments which are absurd and childish. They could do this all the more easily, because no one was in a position to reply to them, or, at least, foreign papers which would have refuted their arguments could not cross the frontiers of the Monarchy.

Naturally the public confidently accepted all they read in regard to us, and the result was a malevolent and hostile disposition towards the Belgians, which has been shown also in the circle of the Police Prefecture of Vienna. Certain high functionaries of this administration distinguished themselves in this respect. Before the declaration of war had been presented to us, countrymen of ours who had just arrived in Vienna, or those whose immediate circumstances obliged them to pass through the capital, were summoned to the police, were questioned, were watched or interned, either under the suspicion that they were spies, or because they were considered as being of age sufficient for military service in their country. Nevertheless, so far as I know, no grave abuse has been committed and none of our compatriots has been really ill-treatel. Thanks to the efforts of our Consul-General with the Police Authorities, and thanks to my representations at the Imperial and Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, three men who had been interned were released, but kept under supervision.

After having announced to me that relations were broken off, Count Berchtold expressed to me in a very kind way his personal regrets, adding that after the end of the war he would be pleased to see me once more occupy the same post, if the Royal Government wished to appoint me to it.

In conformity with your telegraphic instructions I put myself into communication with the Spanish Ambassador, who had already undertaken the protection of Russian and Serbian subjects, and who hastened to undertake the defence of our interests as well.

I also addressed to our Consuls-General and Consuls a circular in which I thanked them in the name of the Royal Government for their whole-hearted co-operation. I told them that they could keep their archives for the time being, while at the same time they were to put themselves into communication with their Spanish colleagues, and I expressed the hope that they would continue, even in their private capacity, to take an interest in the lot of our countrymen who resided in their districts.

Since a faster train service had been organised to the Swiss frontier from the 1st of this month, a saloon was put at my disposal and attached to the train which left Vienna on the 3rd at 10.30 p.m. I left with my daughter and with M. and Mme. de Raymond, accompanied by their three children and a governess. We reached the Swiss frontier at Buchs on the 5th at 7.30 a.m. Free tickets had been handed to us and the transport of our luggage took place under the same conditions.

I am, &c.,

(Signed) COMTE ERREMBAULT DUDZEELE.

No. 51.

The Belgian Minister at Berlin to M. Davignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Hove (Sussex),
September 21st, 1914.

SIR,

I HAD the honour to address to you on the 4th August (*see* No. 25) a telegraphic summary of the conversation I had had the same day with the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, after having received the telegram by which you informed me of the ultimatum of the German Government and the reply which the Government had made to it.

The mission which you entrusted to me immediately after my return to Belgium prevented me, as you know, from sending you a detailed account of this conversation, and now that it is ended I am anxious to carry out this duty.

Your telegram was brought to me on the 3rd towards 8 p.m. By the time I had deciphered it, it was too late for me to go to Wilhelmstrasse. I resolved to postpone until the following morning the verbal explanations which it was my duty to demand from Herr v. Jagow on the subject of the German Government's unjustifiable action. Early the next day I telephoned to him asking him to receive me as soon as possible. He replied, asking me to go immediately. At 9 o'clock I was shown into his room. The Ministry was still empty.

"Well, what have you to say to me?" These were his first words as he hurried to meet me.

"I have to ask you for explanations in regard to the ultimatum which the German Minister handed on Sunday evening to my Government. I suppose you have some reason to give in explanation of such action."

"An absolute necessity forced us to present that demand to you. It is with mortal grief that the Emperor and his Government have had to resign themselves to doing so. To myself it is the most painful resolution and the most cruel thing I have had to do throughout my career. But the passage through Belgium is for Germany a question of life and death. She must be finished with France as quickly as possible, crush her completely so as then to be able to turn against Russia, otherwise she herself will be caught between the hammer and the anvil. We have learnt that the French army was preparing to pass through Belgium and to attack us on our flank. We must forestall her."

"But," I answered, "you are in direct contact with France on a frontier of 200 kilometres; why in order to settle your quarrel did you need to turn aside and pass through our country."

"The French frontier is too strongly fortified, and we are obliged," he repeated, "to act very quickly before Russia has had time to mobilise her army."

"Contrary to what you think, France has given us a formal promise to respect our neutrality, provided that you respect it too. What would you have said if, instead of making us this

promise of her own accord, she had presented to us the same summons before you, if she had demanded a passage through our country, and if we had yielded to her threats? That we were cowards, incapable of defending our neutrality and unworthy of an independent existence?"

Herr von Jagow did not reply to this question.

"Have you," I continued, "anything with which to reproach us? Have we not always correctly and scrupulously fulfilled the duties which the neutrality of Belgium imposed upon us with regard to Germany as well as the other guarantee Powers? Since the foundation of our kingdom have we not been loyal and trustworthy neighbours to you?"

"Germany has nothing with which to reproach Belgium, whose attitude has always been correct."

"And so, in recognition of our loyalty, you wish to make of our country the battlefield for your struggle with France, the battlefield of Europe; and we know what devastation modern warfare brings with it! Have you thought of that?"

"If the Belgian army," the Secretary of State replied, "allows us to pass freely, without destroying the railways, without blowing up the bridges and tunnels, and if it retires on Antwerp without attempting to defend Liége, we promise not only to respect the independence of Belgium, the lives and property of the inhabitants, but also to indemnify you for the loss incurred."

"Sir," I replied, "the Belgian Government, conscious of its duties towards all the guarantors of its neutrality, can make no reply to such a proposal other than the reply which it has made without hesitation. The whole nation will support its King and its Government. You must recognise yourself that no other reply was possible."

As I urged him to speak, Herr von Jagow, in the face of my persistence, ended by saying: "I recognise it. I understand your reply. I understand it as private individual, but as Secretary of State I have no opinion to express." And then he repeated the expression of his grief at having come to such a point after so many years of friendly relationship. But a rapid march through Belgium was for Germany a question of life or death. We in our turn should understand that.

I answered immediately: "Belgium would have lost her honour if she had listened to you, and no nation, any more than an individual, can live without honour. Europe will be our judge. And besides," I added, "you will not take Liége as easily as you think, and you will have to meet England, the faithful guarantor of our neutrality."

At these words Herr Jagow shrugged his shoulders, an action which could be interpreted in two ways. It signified: "What an idea! It is impossible!" Or, perhaps: "The lot is cast, we cannot go back."

I added, before retiring, that I was ready to leave Berlin with my staff and to ask for my passports. "But I cannot break my relations with you in this way," cried the Secretary of State; "perhaps there will still be something for us to talk over." "It is

for my Government to take a decision about that," I replied; " it does not depend upon you or me. I will wait for their orders to ask for my passports."

As I left Herr von Jagow after this painful interview, which was to be our last, I carried away the impression that he had expected something else when I had asked to see him, some unforeseen proposal, perhaps the request to allow the Belgian army to retire in security to Antwerp after having made a show of resistance on the Meuse and having, on the invasion of the country, formally defended the principle of her neutrality. After my first words, the face of the speaker seemed to me to betray a feeling of disappointment, and his persistence in telling me not to break our relations yet strengthened this idea which I had had from the start of our conversation.

I am, &c.,

(Signed) BARON BEYENS.

No. 52.

Baron Beyens, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to M. Davignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

SIR, *Hove (Sussex), September 22nd,* 1914.

IN continuation of my report of yesterday, I have the honour to present to you the account of the conversation I had on the 5th August with the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. I add to it an account of the return journey to Brussels of the Belgian Embassy at Berlin.

On 5th August, in the morning, I received the telegram, in which you directed me to ask for my passports and informed me of the departure of the German Minister from Brussels. I went immediately to the Wilhelmstrasse, where I was received by the Under Secretary of State, to whom I made known your instructions.

Herr Zimmermann expressed to me, with much emotion, his profound regrets for the cause of my departure. But, he added, the passage through Belgium is an absolute necessity for us—a question of life or death (*Sein oder nicht sein*). Germany must crush France as quickly as possible in order to be able then to turn against Russia.

Herr Zimmermann sought no pretext to excuse the violation of our neutrality. He did not invoke the supposed French plan, alleged against France by the Chancellor in the speech which he had delivered the evening before in the Reichstag, of passing through Belgium in order to attack Germany on the Lower Rhine, a plan to which Herr v. Jagow had alluded in his conversation with me.

I replied nearly in the same terms that I had used the evening before in my discussion with Herr Jagow; if France had been ready first and had demanded a passage of us on the same con-

ditions as Germany, we should have made the same reply to her. If, in a cowardly way, we had yielded to her threats, you would not have had enough words of contempt and anger to throw in our faces and we should have deserved them, since we should have failed to keep our word and have violated our engagement to remain neutral, which had been received by the founders of our independence. "You must recognise that we could not have acted in any other way without forfeiting our honour, and you could not imagine for one moment that the Belgian Government would throw itself to the ground before the feet of the German Government and would give up to it the keys of our cities and our fortresses. Have you anything with which to reproach us? Have we not been good and loyal neighbours, desirous of maintaining with you, as with the other nations bordering on Belgium, the most cordial relations? For 80 years no cloud has arisen to darken our relations. And to-day how do you recognise the friendship and the confidence of the Belgian people which is now nearly a century old? By the intention of making its territory the field of European battle and devastation."

Herr Zimmermann simply replied that the department for Foreign Affairs was powerless. Since the order for mobilisation had been issued by the Emperor, all power now belonged to the military authorities. It was they who had considered the invasion of Belgium to be an indispensable operation of war. "I hope," he added with emphasis, "that this war will be the last. It must also mark the end of the policy of alliances which has led to this result."

From this interview I brought away the impression that Herr Zimmermann spoke to me with his customary sincerity and that the Department for Foreign Affairs, since the opening of the Austro-Serbian conflict, had been on the side of a peaceful solution and that it was not due to it that its views and counsels had not prevailed. To-day, even, it is my belief, contrary to what I wrote you at first, that Herr von Jagow and Herr Zimmermann spoke the truth when they assured my colleagues and myself that they did not know beforehand the *text itself* of the ultimatum addressed by Austria-Hungary to Serbia. A superior power intervened to precipitate the march of events. It was the ultimatum from Germany to Russia, sent to St. Petersburg at the very moment when the Vienna Cabinet was showing itself more disposed to conciliation, which let loose the war. As to the hope expressed by Herr Zimmermann that this war would be the last, it is necessary to understand him as speaking on the assumption of a victorious campaign by Germany. The Under Secretary of State, in spite of the visible fear which the coalition of his country's enemies caused him, is too good a Prussian to have had at that moment any doubt of final victory.

He was not able to promise me that I should be sent by way of Holland; he feared that the military authorities would have me taken to Denmark. Before leaving the Department I urged upon Dr. Zahn, Director of the Protocol, with whom I had always maintained the best relations, that I should not be obliged to take a route so out of the way as that of Denmark. Herr Zahn

assured me that he would do his best and he kept his promise. In fact when Count von Mirbach, Councillor at Law, brought me my passport at 3 p.m., after having expressed to me his regret at having to undertake such a mission, he told me that a special train would be ready to take me the following morning with the English Ambassador to the Dutch frontier.

I had only a few hours left to finish my preparations, to dismiss my servants, and to entrust the archives of the Legation to the care of the Spanish Ambassador who had been authorised by his Government to undertake the protection of Belgian interests during the war. I recommended the Councillor and the Secretaries to hold themselves in readiness to depart the following morning at 7 a.m., and I appointed the Legation as our meeting place.

On the 6th August at the hour named, M. Peltzer, Major and Madame de Mélotte, M. Adrien Nieuwenhuys, M. Jacques Davignon, M. and Madame Rothé and myself, accompanied by two Belgian servants, left the Hotel of the Jägerstrasse in motor-cars sent in part by the Department for Foreign Affairs. The roads which led to the Lehrter Bahnhof, where we were to join the train, were guarded by mounted police. There were few people about in the streets at that hour of the morning and our journey did not give rise to any demonstrations.

The special train which was placed under the orders of a Colonel of the Reserve, whose attitude towards us was very courteous, was provided with a dining car. Before our departure Count Botha von Wedel, Minister Plenipotentiary, came and greeted the British Ambassador and myself in the name of the Under Secretary of State, and enquired if we needed anything. The journey took place slowly on the line Stendhal-Hanover-Minden, with long stops in order to allow the passage of trains full of reservists. At the first stations the population watched our journey without animosity, perhaps because they were unaware of our identity. At Minden on the Weser our identity had obviously been divulged, for an assembly of curious people, mostly women, approached the dining car in which I was chatting with Sir Edward Goschen. They shouted patriotic songs for our benefit, put out their tongues and shook their fists with accompanying words to which we paid no attention.

The German train took the Ambassador to the Hook of Holland where he embarked for England. The staff of the Belgian Legation and myself got out at The Hague. At the Dutch frontier, which we crossed on the 7th at 8 a.m. we were able to obtain papers; they informed us of the events at Liége. After passing twenty-four hours without any news, in an anguish of patriotism which you will easily understand, the telegrams giving an account of the heroic resistance of General Leman and of our soldiers made our hearts beat with joy and pride. Our travelling companions belonging to the British Embassy warmly expressed their admiration for the conduct of the Belgian Army.

At the Hague we found my colleague, Baron Fallon, at the station, to whom I had been able to telegraph in the course of the journey. He gave us a most cordial reception, as likewise did

Prince Albert de Ligne, and brought us the latest editions of Dutch papers filled with news concerning the defence of Liége. Thanks to his extreme obligingness, the two railway companies which own the line as far as the Belgian frontier, without any charge put at our disposal special trains which took us, one to Rotterdam and the other to Antwerp. We arrived at Brussels at 6 p.m.

In conclusion I am glad to bring to your notice the intelligence and devotion with which I was assisted by the members of the Legation in the course of these difficult days. You know already of the indefatigable zeal shown on all occasions by M. Peltzer. The two secretaries, the Military Attaché and the Chancellor, have rivalled him in calmness and sang froid. I must give special praise to the courage shown by the ladies of the Legation. It was an encouragement and a consolation to us.

The few hours which were left me before my departure did not allow of my taking with me our Consul-General at Hamburg. He would not have been able to reach Berlin in time, as the line was crowded by military trains. I should have been glad to spare him the fatigue and weariness of returning by way of Denmark.

I am, &c.,

(Signed.) BARON BEYENS.

No. 53.

Baron Moncheur, Belgian Minister at Constantinople to M. Davignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

SIR, *Constantinople, September 22nd,* 1914.

IN diplomatic circles for the last three days, a more decided uneasiness has prevailed with regard to the possibility of a declaration of war by Turkey.

The Grand Vizier continues to affirm in the most persistent fashion Turkey's intention of remaining neutral. The Sultan expressed himself in the same way in the course of the audience which he granted yesterday to Sir Louis Mallet.

But, as I was told yesterday by an Ambassador whose judgment in the matter is the less suspect since he does not belong to the Triple Entente, it is no longer the Sultan or the Grand Vizier who governs; it is not even Enver Pasha; it is Germany. She rules with a high hand not only the Porte, but the Army and the Navy, into which she has sent hundreds of officers.

The *Goeben* and the *Breslau* fly the Turkish flag but the crews have not even discarded their German uniforms. On the Dardanelles and on the Bosphorus the cannon of the forts are manned by German artillerymen.

Turkey is no longer anything but an instrument of war at the disposal of Germany, and she will make use of it on the day she finds it to her advantage to do so.

It is true that the Turkish army is much too weak to make any effective diversion against Russia. But Roumania seems on the point of taking up an attitude hostile to Austria, this she

could only do after assuring herself of the benevolent neutrality of Bulgaria. Perhaps in Berlin there is a desire to influence the decisions of Roumania and Bulgaria by causing them to fear an attack on their weak side, that is to say, their coasts which they could not defend against a bombardment by the Turkish fleet.

On Sunday and yesterday the *Breslau* and *Goeben* in succession had gunnery drill in the Black Sea. These going and comings have helped to raise apprehensions here.

On Sunday morning Sir L. Mallet once more declared quite frankly to the Grand Vizier that if these two units went out into the Aegean Sea the English fleet which is at the entrance to the Dardanelles would sink them immediately.

(Signed) BARON MONCHEUR.

No. 54.

Telegram communicated on 25th September by the American Consul at Antwerp to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

For Legation, Brussels, Circular 23,
September 24th.

AT the request of the German Government and on the understanding that the department is merely acting as a medium of communication and has no comments whatever to make, you may bring to the attention of the Foreign Office the fact that on August 22nd the German Government addressed a note to the American Ambassador at Berlin referring to Article 11 of the Congo act of February 26th, 1885, relating to the neutralisation of the Colonies lying within the conventional free trade zone. The note points out that chapter three of this act deals with neutrality and that Germany is willing to agree to such neutralisation.

BRYAN,
Secretary of State, Washington.

No. 55.

Baron A. Grenier, Belgian Minister at Madrid, to M. Davignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

SIR, *Madrid, September 30th,* 1914.

I HAVE not neglected to carry out the instructions contained in your telegram of August 30th last (*see* No. 40) relating to the alleged bad treatment of which, according to the *Neue Freie Presse,* Austrian subjects had been victims at Antwerp and at Ostend.

The Minister of State has just informed me that the Embassy of his Catholic Majesty at Vienna has on the 11th of this month handed to the Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs the protest of the Belgian Government.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) BARON A. GRENIER.

No. 56.

Baron Guillaume, the Belgian Minister in France, to M. Davignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Bordeaux, October 11th, 1914.

SIR,

THE President of the Republic summoned me this morning and received me in the presence of the Minister for Foreign Affairs. He said to me in effect:—

"I have during the night and this morning received many telegrams from M. Klobukowski informing me of the grave situation in which Belgium is placed. It has caused me great emotion and sincere regrets. I have also learned that a Cabinet Council, at which General Pau and the English general were present, has declared that in view of probable attacks by the German forces the Belgian Government and its army must leave the national territory. King Albert has expressed a desire to receive for himself, his Government and his Army the hospitality of France. He has named the port of Havre, adding that the Army will continue to co-operate in the joint action of the Allies.

"The Government of the Republic required no deliberation on this matter, since at the first word we were unanimous in affirming our sentiments of affection and admiration for the noble Belgian people and in declaring that the widest hospitality would be offered to them in France, leaving them their full independence and sovereignty.

"I wish to assure King Albert without delay and I beg you to lend me your assistance in conveying the following cypher telegram to His Majesty:—

"'His Majesty, King Albert, Ostend.

"'I am informed of the decision made by the Belgian Government. The Government of the Republic is profoundly moved by it and will immediately take the necessary steps to assure the sojourn in France of Your Majesty and his ministers in full independence and sovereignty. I am anxious to say personally to Your Majesty how proud France is of offering you, until the hour of our joint victory, hospitality in the town which you have chosen, and I beg you to accept the assurance of my unalterable friendship.'"

REYMANE POINCARÉ.

The President of the Republic and M. Delcassé have omitted nothing to assure me of their sympathy in the misfortunes which are falling so unjustly upon Belgium. M. Poincaré laid much emphasis on the measures which will be taken in order to safeguard the sovereignty and independence of the country.

During the day I had an opportunity of being received a second time by the President of the Republic, who had charged M. William Martin the Chief of the Protocol, with the duty of going at once to Havre in order to look into the question of making provision for Their Majesties, the Ministers, and the high

functionaries of the Belgian State. I had an opportunity of conferring several times with the Chief of the Political Direction. Everywhere I found a welcome full of sincere grief, completely sympathetic and absolutely devoted.

I am, &c.,

(Signed) BARON GUILLAUNE.

No. 57.

His Majesty King Albert to the President of the French Republic.

Ostend, October 12th, 1914.

M. LE PRESIDENT,

I AM profoundly touched by the hospitality which France is ready to offer so cordially to the Belgian Government and by the measures which the Republic is taking in order to secure our full independence and sovereignty. We await with unshakable confidence the hour of joint victory. Fighting side by side for a just cause our courage will know no yielding.

I beg you, M. le President, to accept the assurance of my unalterable affection.

(Signed) ALBERT.

No. 58.

M. Davignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Baron Grenier, Belgian Minister at Madrid.

(Telegraphic.)

Le Havre, October 21st, 1914.

PLEASE have recourse to the good offices of the Spanish Ambassador in order to forward to the German Government the following telegram:—

Under date September 25th, the United States Consul at Antwerp sent a telegram (see No. 54) according to which he was authorised to draw the attention of the Belgian Government to the fact that on August 22nd the German Government addressed a note to the American Ambassador at Berlin referring to Article 11 of the Act of Berlin of February 26th, 1885, with regard to the neutralisation of the Colonies within the conventional free-trade zone. The note drew attention to the fact that this Act deals with neutrality and that Germany is disposed to accept such a neutralisation.

The Belgian Government cannot explain how this note, which was sent on August 22nd to the Ambassador of the United States at Berlin, did not reach him until September 25th.

Under date August 7th the Belgian Government put itself into communication with the French and British Governments to propose to them the neutralisation of the conventional basin of the Congo, and, in the meanwhile, gave to its agents the order to observe a strictly defensive attitude. It desired, in fact, that the war should not be extended to Central Africa.

The British and French Governments could not be parties to this proposal by reason of the acts of hostility which had already at this time been committed in Africa. In particular German forces had attacked British Central Africa and British East Africa.

At the same time the Belgian Government was advised that the German Colonial forces had from August 22nd been attacking the port of Lukuga, on Lake Tanganyika.

The Belgian Government in consequence draws the attention of the Imperial Government to the fact that it was they who had taken the initiative in hostilities in Africa, and had thus opposed the realisation of the desire of the Belgian Government concerning the application of the above-mentioned Article 11.

(Signed) DAVIGNON.

No. 59.

Baron Moncheur, Belgian Minister at Constantinople, to M. Davignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, October 23rd, 1914.

In consequence of the Russian successes the Germans are increasing their pressure on the Porte with the object of bringing about war. The Porte still gives the Ambassadors assurances of peaceful intentions, but pushes forward its preparations for war.

No. 60.

Baron Moncheur, Belgian Minister at Constantinople, to M. Davignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Constantinople, October 31st, 1914.

I had the honour to telegraph to you on the 23rd of this month that Germany was increasing her pressure on Turkey to go to war, as her armies are experiencing reverses in Poland as well as in France.

Since then events have been very much hastened.

The day before yesterday, October 29th, the English Ambassador came to see me and warned me that according to reliable information troops of Bedouins, led by German officers, had

crossed the Egyptian frontier, and that if the news were confirmed a *casus belli* with Turkey would be the result.

But on the same evening we learnt the still more serious fact of the attack on Russian troops and ports by a part of the Turkish fleet, commanded of course by German officers.

According to the unanimous opinion of diplomatic circles the *coup* was prepared and executed by the Germans without the knowledge of the Grand Vizier and perhaps even of the Turkish Naval Minister, Djemal Pacha, with the object of forcing the Government, several members of which had a well-marked repugnance to war, to decide on it.

From that moment there was no longer any hope of maintaining peace here, and I telegraphed to you on the night of the 29th-30th that the Ambassadors of the Triple Entente were preparing for departure.

Yesterday, October 30th, they went separately to the Grand Vizier to demand their passports. Prince Saïd Halim was in a state of extreme agitation and seemed to be in despair at the turn that events were taking. He repeated with emphasis to the Ambassadors that he did not desire war and there is reason for believing that he spoke in good faith.

To-day at 2 o'clock the Ambassadors had not yet received their passports and a persistent rumour was even going about this morning that all hope of some arrangement was not lost.

But this was not possible. To make good the outrage committed on Russia by ships flying the Turkish flag, it was not sufficient for the Porte to make excuses and to disavow the action of the German admiral who was in command. The Powers of the Triple Entente would further require that the German crews and, in general, all officers of this nationality belonging to the German mission to Turkey should be sent back. Now the Young Turk Government, even if it desired to have recourse to this measure of safety, would lack the courage and energy necessary to execute it. It is caught in the German wheel and will remain there.

I have just telegraphed to you that the Ambassadors are leaving this evening whether they have received their passports or not. The French Ambassador has postponed his departure till to-morrow evening for reasons of personal convenience.

The press has received an order to publish a *communiqué* designed to mislead the public and to make it believe that Russia commenced hostilities. This manœuvre will have been dictated by Germany, and it recalls that which was employed to make France appear responsible for the violation of Belgian neutrality.

Here the city is very quiet. There has been no demonstration against foreigners. There is rather a feeling of consternation which prevails among many Turks who do not share the ideas of Enver Pasha and his chauvinistic followers.

It is probable enough that this fresh war will have no considerable development, at least for a long time. The Powers of

the Triple Entente are very much occupied elsewhere and will not make any very great efforts here.

As I have often written, England and Russia, who did not desire any new complications from the East, have here shown extreme patience for three months. But if they could have known that peace could not be maintained it would have been preferable to send an ultimatum to Turkey on the arrival of the *Goeben* in the Dardanelles last August. Since that time, in fact, the entry to the Straits, on the side of the Black Sea as well as the Aegean Sea, has been very much strengthened by new batteries manned by Germans, and by a whole system of mines. And in other respects we must recognise that, thanks to the sacrifices which are ruining the country and thanks to the millions which have come from Germany, the army is much more strongly organised than at the outbreak of the European war.

It is therefore probable that the European fleets will not attempt at present to force the Straits. From this point of view it is very regrettable that in the Russian Black Sea Fleet there is no unit equal in strength to the Goeben.

I had the honour to telegraph to you on the 30th of this month that in accordance with the instructions you transmitted by telegram on the 9th August to M. Leclercq, I would remain at my post unless the Porte handed me my passports.

In view of the irregularity of telegraphic communications, I thought it advisable to return to this question in my telegram of to-day, and I asked you to let me know by courier if you adhere to your instructions of the 9th August.

I do not think that the Porte will hand me my passports unless the Germans, who, I repeat, rule everything with a high hand, consider that my presence here offers danger from the point of view of information that I might supply to the Allies.

But in reference to this question, I think I ought to let you know that a German who is connected with the Embassy of his country at Constantinople has here evolved the opinion that, the Belgian Government, having left Belgian soil, is no longer considered existent by Germany, and that in consequence, the Embassy, in order to remain faithful to its theory, must prevent the Porte from sending his passports to the representative of a Government which no longer exists.

I should not be able to stay here with dignity if my maintenance were based on such a theory.

I must, nevertheless, add that up to the present nothing in the behaviour of the Sublime Porte towards me indicates that it has adopted the point of view attributed to the German Embassy.

I am, &c.,

(Signed) BARON MONCHEUR.

No. 61.

M. Davignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Baron Moncheur, Belgian Minister at Constantinople. (Telegraphic.)

Le Havre, November 1st, 1914.

In view of the existing tension you will judge whether it is not desirable, through our Consuls, to advise our countrymen residing in Turkey to go to the coast towns where they will have an opportunity of embarking.

(Signed) DAVIGNON.

No. 62.

M. Davignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. van Ypersele de Strihou, Belgian Minister at Bukarest. (Telegraphic.)

Le Havre, November 6th, 1914.

The Turkish Minister has asked for his passports. Notify the Belgian Minister at Constantinople either directly or through the Rumanian Government to do the same and to leave Turkey with his staff and the consular officials.

(Signed) DAVIGNON.

63.

Jonkheer de Deede, Minister of the Netherlands, to M. Davignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Sir, *Le Havre, November 7th,* 1914.

I have the honour to bring to the knowledge of Your Excellency that the Government of the Queen has authorised me, in accordance with the request of the Turkish Minister, to look after Turkish interests in Belgium during the rupture of diplomatic relations between Belgium and Turkey.

I am, &c.,

(Signed) JONKHEER DE WEEDE.

64.

M. Davignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to all the Belgian Ministers in Foreign Countries.

Sir, *Le Havre, November 9th,* 1914.

The French Government has informed the Belgian Government of the state of war existing between France and Turkey, and in these circumstances the presence at Havre of the Turkish Minister with the Belgian Government became delicate. Understanding the situation in which he was placed by the course

of events His Excellency Nousret Sadoullah Bey took the initiative by asking for his passports and by putting Turkish interests in Belgium under the protection of the Minister of the Netherlands.

Under date November 6th I sent to His Excellency the passports which he had asked for, and remarked that, according to the interpretation of the Belgian Government, the rupture of diplomatic relations in no way implied a state of war between the two countries.

The Belgian Minister at Constantinople has received instructions to ask for his passports and to leave Turkey. The care of Belgian interests in Turkey has been entrusted to the Ambassador of the United States of America.

(Signed) DAVIGNON.

65.

Baron Moncheur, Belgian Minister at Constantinople, to M. Davignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

SIR, *Melin, November 16th*, 1914.

ON Saturday, the 7th of this month, at 4 p.m., I received a telegram from my colleague at Bukarest informing me that the Turkish Minister in Belgium having asked for his passports, you ordered me to do the same and to leave Turkey with my staff and the officials of the Belgian Consular Service.

Since receiving your communication, made through M. van Ypersele de Strihou, I went to the Ambassador of the United States in order to make all arrangements for the protection of Belgians remaining in Turkey.

On his advice I telephoned to the Porte to ask if the Grand Vizier could receive me. On receiving the reply that His Highness was at a meeting of the council, I sent the same evening to his residence on the Bosphorus a letter setting out the reasons why I was asking for my passports and informing the Porte that in leaving Constantinople with my staff I left Baron de Hulsch and Baron Marghetich, attached provisionally to the American Embassy, to help M. Morgenthan in protecting my countrymen and their interests.

Passports were sent to me 24 hours later in an envelope of the Sublime Porte, but without any accompanying letter.

I left Constantinople on Tuesday, November 10th, at 7 a.m. The American Ambassador sent me his motor car, and in spite of the early hour, he came to say good-bye at the station. The Grand Vizier had sent his Chief Secretary to salute me on the departure of the train.

My colleague of the Bulgarian Legation having previously warned his Government of my passage through Bulgarian territory, the Sub-Perfect came to salute me at the frontier station in the name of M. Radoslavof. At Dedeagatch the authorities

also waited upon me, acting under superior orders, and facilitated my departure in the most obliging manner. From Dedeagatch I telegraphed my thanks to M. Radoslavof.

The French and English subjects at Constantinople, whose protection is also entrusted to the Ambassador of the United States, highly praised the efficient way in which he has taken their interests in hand. He has already shown much energy and decision in this respect.

It is entirely due to him that several English subjects whom Enver Pasha wished to hold back as hostages were able to leave the country. Consequently, I am certain that our colony will be well protected.

The Legation is closed, but I have left the staff of Khavas's, just as has been done in the other Embassies and Legations. This is essential for the protection of the house and its contents. The American flag has been hoisted.

I am, &c.,

(Signed) BARON MONCHEUR.

66.

The Minister of the United States of America, to M. Davignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

MR. MINISTER, *Brussels, November 16th*, 1914.

I AM in receipt of the following telegram from my Government, which I am directed to bring to Your Excellency's knowledge:

"At request of German Government, and on understanding that the department is merely acting as a medium of communication and has no comments whatsoever to make, you may bring to attention of Foreign Office the fact, that on August 22nd German Government addressed a Note to American Ambassador referring to Article 11 of the Congo Act, February 26th, 1885, relating to neutralisation of colonies lying within the conventional free trade zone. The note points out that Chapter 3 of this Act deals with neutrality and that Germany is willing to agree to such neutralisation."

I avail myself, &c.,

(Signed) BRAND WHITLOCK.

(*See* No. 54.)

No. 67.

M. Davignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Mr. Brand Whitlock, Minister of United States of America.

SIR, *Le Havre, December 5th,* 1914.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt from Your Excellency of the letter of November 16th, referring to the neutralisation of the Conventional Basin of the Congo suggested by Germany.

The proposal of the German Government, which was dated August 22nd, was notified to us by the Consul-General of the United States at Antwerp on September 25th.

Your Excellency has learned by reading the Grey Book the steps which the Belgian Government has taken with a view to maintaining the neutrality of the Congo. (*See* First Grey Book, No. 57.) You will find herewith a copy of the telegram regarding this matter which I addressed on October 21st to the Imperial Government through the Spanish Government. (*See* No. 58.)

I am, &c.,
(Signed) DAVIGNON.

PART 2.

SECTION 10.

GERMANY ACCUSES BELGIUM OF HAVING CONCLUDED A MILITARY UNDERSTANDING WITH ENGLAND.

No. 98.

M. Davignon, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to all Diplomatic Representatives abroad.

SIR, *Havre, October 19th,* 1914.

THE *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* has recently published an article with the object of gaining credence for the view that in 1906 England had, in view of a Franco-German war, endeavoured to involve Belgium in the Triple Entente. This article has been commented upon in the *Times* of the 14th October.

You will find enclosed a note refuting the allegations of the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*.

I have the honour to request you to be so good as to cause it to be inserted in one of the principal newspapers in the country to which you are accredited.

I am, &c.,
DAVIGNON.

Enclosure to No. 98.

Note.

The *Times* of the 14th October reproduces a long article from the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* commenting on the discovery made in the archives of the War Office at Brussels of a

document entitled " Intervention Anglaise en Belgique," and of a memoire addressed to the Belgian Minister of War, purporting to prove that in April, 1906, the Chief of the Staff, on the initiative of the English Military Attache, and with the approval of General Grierson, had elaborated a plan of co-operation between the British Expeditionary Forces and the Belgian Army in the event of a Franco-German war. This agreement would probably have been preceded by a similar arrangement concluded with the French General Staff.

The *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* also reproduces certain passages from a report of the Minister at Berlin written in December, 1911, with regard to another plan of the Belgian Staff, in which the measures to be taken in the event of a violation of Belgian neutrality by Germany are examined. Baron Greindl pointed out that this plan only took stock of the precautions to be taken in the single case of an aggression by Germany, whereas in view of its geographical situation, Belgium might equally well be exposed to an attack from France or from England.

The *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* draws from this discovery the strange conclusion that England intended to draw Belgium into the war, and at a certain moment contemplated the violation of Dutch neutrality.

We have only one regret to express with regard to the discovery of these documents, viz., that the publication of our military works is maimed and arranged in such a manner as to give to the reader the impression of the duplicity of England and of an adhesion on the part of Belgium to the policy of the Triple Entente in violation of its duties of neutrality. We ask the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* to publish *in extenso* the result of their ferretings in our secret papers. This would furnish a new and striking proof of the loyalty, the correctness, and the impartiality which for 84 years Belgium has brought to the discharge of her international duties.

It was quite natural that Colonel Bernardiston, the military agent at Brussels of one of the Powers guaranteeing Belgian neutrality, should on the occasion of the Algeciras crisis make enquiries of the Chief of the Belgian Staff as to the measures which it had taken to prevent every violation of this neutrality.

The Chief of the Staff—then Lieutenant-General Ducarne—replied that Belgium was in a position to repel an invasion from *whatever quarter it might come.*

Did the discussion pass these limits, and did Colonel Barnardiston, in a conversation of a private and confidential character, reveal to General Ducarne the plan of campaign which the British General Staff would have desired to follow in the event of this neutrality being violated? We doubt it, but what can be solemnly affirmed, and the contrary cannot be proved, is that neither the King nor his Government have ever been invited, either directly or indirectly, to join the Triple Entente in the event of a Franco-German war.

Further, by their words and their actions, they have always shown so categorical an attitude that every supposition that they would depart from the most strict neutrality has been removed *a priori*.

So far as concerns the despatch of Baron Greindl, of the 23rd December, 1911, it has reference to a proposal for the defence of Luxemburg, due to the personal initiative of the Head of the First Division of the War Office. This proposal was entirely private in its character, and had not been approved by the War Office.

There is no ground for astonishment if this proposal had in view, above all, an attack from the side of Germany, since the great German military writers, and especially von Bernhardi, von Schliefenbach and von der Goltz spoke openly in their treatises on the Next War of the violation of Belgian territory by the German armies.

At the beginning of hostilities the Imperial Government, by the mouth of the Chancellor and of the Foreign Secretary, did not seek empty pretexts for the aggression of which Belgium has been the victim. It justified it on the ground of military interests.

Since then, faced with the universal reprobation which this act has aroused, it seeks to mislead opinion by representing Belgium as having been subject to the Triple Entente from a time preceding the war.

These intrigues will deceive no one. They will turn to the shame of Germany. History will testify that that Power, after having bound herself by treaty to defend the neutrality of Belgium, took the initiative in violating it without even being able to find a pretext to justify herself.

No. 99.

M. Davignon, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to all the Diplomatic Representatives abroad.

SIR, *Havre, 4th December,* 1914.

GERMANY having discovered a note on the interview which took place in 1912 between General Jungbluth and Colonel Bridges, returns to the alleged Barnardiston secret, and endeavours to show that the aggression of Germany against Belgium was justified because the latter had herself failed in her duties of neutrality by negotiating a military agreement with England.

I have thought it my duty to oppose a new *démenti* to this assertion. You will find enclosed a communication on this subject.

I am, &c.,

DAVIGNON.

Enclosure to No. 99.

Note.

In its number of the 26th November, the *Kölnische Zeitung* writes:—

> "'We were compelled to violate Belgian neutrality because Belgium had not observed her duties of neutrality. The truth of this forcibly appears from two incontestable documents. There is the one published by the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, proving that there existed between Belgium and England a secret agreement for the co-operation of the military forces of these two countries in the struggle against Germany.
>
> "On the other hand," adds the *Kölnische Zeitung*, "it follows, from the report of the confidential conversation between Messrs. Jungbluth and Bridges, that the English intended to disembark in Belgium, in any case, even if their aid was not solicited by Belgium."

The thesis advanced by the German press thus consists in justifying the violation by Germany of the neutrality of Belgium, on the ground that Belgium herself, by negotiating with England a military agreement against Germany, had failed in her duties of neutrality.

This is a false thesis, contradicted by the facts and by the very documents which the German press cites.

When on the 13th October the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* published for the first time the secret Barnardiston document, we challenged it to prove the existence of a military agreement between Belgium and England. This challenge has not been taken up, and the photographic documents which it publishes have no value as to this point. One would seek in vain to infer from them that Belgium had not observed the obligation of the strictest neutrality.

What, in fact, happened in 1906? Colonel Barnardiston, military attaché to the British Legation, went at the end of January to the head of the first department at the War Office, and had an interview with him.

Colonel Barnardiston asked General Ducarne if Belgium was ready to defend her neutrality. The reply was in the affirmative.

He then enquired as to the number of days necessary for the mobilisation of our army.

"It takes place in four days," said the General.

"How many men can you raise?" continued the military attaché.

The General confirmed that we would mobilise 100,000 men.

After having received this information, Colonel Barnardiston declared that in the event of the violation of our neutrality by Germany, England would send to Belgium 100,000 men to defend us. He further pressed the question that he should know whether we were ready to resist a German invasion.

The General replied that we were ready to defend ourselves at Liége against Germany, at Namur against France, and at Antwerp against England. There then followed several conversations between the Chief of the Staff and the military attaché on

the measures which England would take with a view to giving effect to her guarantee.

In devoting himself to this study, the Chief of the Staff only performed his most elementary duty, which was precisely to study the dispositions calculated to enable Belgium to repel, either alone or with the aid of her guarantors, a violation of her neutrality.

On the 10th May, 1906, General Ducarne addressed to the Minister of War a report on his interviews with the British military attaché. In this report it is observed on two occasions that the despatch of English help to Belgium would be conditional on the violation of its territory. Further, a marginal note of the Minister,(1) which by an excess of perfidy the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* does not translate, in order that it may escape the majority of German readers, establishes incontestably that the entry of the English into Belgium would not take place till after the violation of our neutrality by Germany.

The course of events has sufficiently proved that these precautions were justified. These very natural conversations between the Chief of the Staff and the British military attaché merely demonstrate the serious apprehensions entertained by England on the subject of the violation by Germany of the neutrality of Belgium.

Were these apprehensions legitimate? To be convinced on this point, it is sufficient to read the works of the great German military writers of the period—von Bernhardi, von Schliefenbach, von der Goltz.

Were the conversations of General Ducarne and Colonel Barnardiston followed by a convention or an *entente*?

Germany will herself furnish us with an answer by a document which she has caused to be published in the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* of the 25th November. This document, which refers to an interview between General Jungbluth and Colonel Bridges, furnishes a striking testimony that the conversation on the fulfilment of the guarantee by England had had no results in 1912 and was at the same point at which it had been left six years before, in 1906.

No document could justify in a clearer manner the loyalty with which the Government of the King fulfilled their international obligations.

Colonel Bridges is reported to have said that, on the occasion of the last occurrences, as we were not in a position to defend our neutrality ourselves, the British Government would have disembarked immediately, even if we had not asked for assistance.

To which General Jungbluth is said to have replied immediately: "But you could not disembark in our country without our consent."

Is there any reason for attaching so much importance to the views of a military attaché which, as we could prove, have never been shared by the Foreign Office? Did he admit the thesis, false in our view although supported by some authors, that, in

(1) The note is in the handwriting of the General and not of the Minister (*see* No. 101).

the event of a violation of neutrality, the intervention of a guarantor is justifiable, even in the absence of any appeal from the guaranteed? We do not know. One thing is certain that the military attaché, when faced with the objection of the General, did not insist.

Was Belgium bound to communicate these conversations to her guarantors? As to the first, Colonel Barnardiston was not authorised to contract an engagement any more than General Ducarne was authorised to take note of a promise of assistance. The incriminated conversations had, moreover, a purely military character, they could have no political bearing, they never formed the subject of deliberation by the Government, and they were not known to the Department of Foreign Affairs till a much later date.

So far as concerns the interview between General Jungbluth and Colonel Bridges, was it necessary to inform the powers that the latter had given expression to an opinion which the Belgian Government would not admit any more than the British Government would, and against which General Jungbluth had immediately protested, without his interviewer thinking it necessary to insist on it.

The alleged justification of Germany turns against her. In his speech of the 4th of August, in his interview in the morning with the English Ambassador, the Imperial Chancellor declared that the aggression against Belgium was to be attributed only to strategic necessity. The cause is understood.

No. 100.

M. Davignon, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to all Diplomatic Representatives abroad.

SIR, *Havre, 15th December*, 1914.

IN continuation of my letter of the 4th December last with reference to the allegations of the German Government regarding an alleged Anglo-Belgian military agreement, I have the honour to direct your attention to the publication in the *Times* of the 7th of this month of the account of the conversation which took place between Sir E. Grey and Count de Lalaing on the 7th April, 1913.

I enclose, for your information and use, a translation of the English communiqué.

I am, &c.,

(Signed) DAVIGNON.

Enclosure to No. 100.

BELGIAN NEUTRALITY.

Proof of British Sincerity.

With reference to statements implying that Great Britain ever contemplated a violation of Belgian neutrality, the Foreign Office issues for publication the following record of a conversation with the Belgian Minister on April 7th, 1913. It was sent to the British Minister in Brussels and a record was communicated by him to the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs at the time:—

"SIR,

"IN speaking to the Belgian Minister to-day I said, speaking unofficially, that it had been brought to my knowledge that there was apprehension in Belgium lest we should be the first to violate Belgian neutrality. I did not think that this apprehension could have come from a British source.

"The Belgian Minister informed me that there had been talk, in a British source which he could not name, of the landing of troops in Belgium by Great Britain, in order to anticipate a possible dispatch of German troops through Belgium to France.

"I said that I was sure that this Government would not be the first to violate the neutrality of Belgium, and I did not believe that any British Government would be the first to do so, nor would public opinion here ever approve of it. What we had to consider, and it was a somewhat embarrassing question, was what it would be desirable and necessary for us, as one of the guarantors of Belgian neutrality, to do if Belgian neutrality was violated by any Power. For us to be the first to violate it and to send troops into Belgium would be to give Germany, for instance, justification for sending troops into Belgium also. What we desired in the case of Belgium, as in that of other neutral countries, was that their neutrality should be respected, and as long as it was not violated by any other Power we should certainly not send troops ourselves into their territory.

"I am, &c.,

"E. GREY."

No. 101.

M. Davignon, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to all Diplomatic Representatives abroad.

SIR, *Havre, 13th January,* 1915.

IN my despatch of the 4th December I had the honour of sending you a denial of the accusation made by the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* against Belgium, to the effect that the latter

country had deviated from her duty of neutrality by negotiating with Great Britain a military agreement directed against Germany.

In this communiqué I said that a marginal note made by the Minister of War established the fact that the entry of British troops into Belgium would only take place after the violation of our neutrality by Germany.

At the time when I prepared the communiqué I had been unable to obtain a copy of the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* containing a photograph of this document. I only had before me the German translation of the Ducarne Report made by the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* and reproduced by the German papers. This translation omits the most important phrase in the document, which says "that the entry of the British into Belgium would only take place after our neutrality had been violated by Germany." It is true that the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* in a later portion of its article prints this phrase in French, letting it be understood that it is merely a marginal note. But now it appears, as is shown by the photograph, that the phrase forms part of the Report of General Ducarne, that it was written by his hand, and that its proper place is marked by a reference mark.

In these circumstances it appears to me necessary to call the attention of the various Governments and of readers to the falsification of the Ducarne document by the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*. I should be obliged if you would be kind enough to obtain the publication of this communiqué, which is in the form of a newspaper article, in one of the newspapers of your capital. It is unnecessary for you to make it the subject of a communication to the Government.

I am, &c.,

(Signed) M. DAVIGNON.

Enclosure to No. 101.

THE BARNARDISTON AFFAIR AND HISTORICAL CRITICISM.

The *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* has a singular way of perusing, reading, and translating documents. German learned criticism when carried away by the heat of argument loses all sense of cold objectivity. Guided by its desires, it sees, or fails to see; it inserts phrases in the text or excludes them; it transposes or invents.

* * *

The Barnardiston affair is a remarkable example of this.

On the 13th October the *Zeitung* mentioned the discovery which German searchers made in the offices of the Belgian General Staff, and the Ducarne Report, which sets out the interviews of Barnardiston with certain Belgian officers.

It then stated that this report was part of a dossier (*Mappe*) bearing the title "Intervention Anglaise en Belgique," and it

endeavoured to show that from the details of this report it followed that a "convention" had been concluded between Belgium and Great Britain.

An answer was immediately made that the report and its details did not allow of this incorrect conclusion, that there were interviews but that there was never an agreement.

On the 25th November the *Zeitung* again took the matter up and published facsimiles of the documents. We no longer hear of the title "Intervention Anglaise en Belgique": a new title appeared. According to the *Zeitung*, which had suddenly become clairvoyante, the famous report had been enclosed in a wrapper (*Umschlag*) with the inscription "Conventions Anglo-Belges."

This second discovery, made just at the right time, and at a moment when the *Zeitung* found itself in a position to make no reply, appeared sufficiently strange. How was it that this inscription which, being placed at the top, ought to have attracted attention at the very first moment, was not seen on the 13th October, and could only be seen on the 25th November.

*
* *

Suspicious people then examined the documents more closely. They compared the photographs and the translations, and it was seen that some of the versions were akin to forgeries.

We understand that the *Zeitung* maintains that the Barnardiston affair was not limited to pour-parlers. It makes out that there was an agreement, and this is how it goes about to show to its kind readers that it is right.

The photograph of the Ducarne Report contains the following phrase:—

> "My visitor (Barnardiston) emphasised the following points: (1) Our CONVERSATION WAS absolutely *confidential.*"

The *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* has wonderful eyesight. It stated:—

> "Herr Barnardiston betonte: 1° dass unser ABKOMMEN absolut vertraulish *sein sollte.*"

It turned the word "conversation" into convention." It made Barnardiston say that our CONVENTION *would be* absolutely confidential.

How can it then help succeeding in its claims? Voltaire required two lines to hang a man. But Germany has made progress since then. To curse a people three letters in a word are sufficient. A "conversation" became "convention."

Could there be a more patent or more shameful forgery?

*
* *

But that is not all. In the photograph of the official record of the report erasures and additions are visible. When General Ducarne was reporting the suggestions or the first démarche of Barnardiston he perceived that he had omitted to mention at the very beginning the hypothesis on which the interview was based. He wrote five lines in the margin, and by two signs he marked the place where the addition ought to figure in his letter.

Alas, this addition troubled the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*! The actual words were "the entry of the British into Belgium would only take place after the violation of our neutrality by Germany." What could it do to diminish or remove the effect of this? It was quite simple. In its translation the *Zeitung* does not mention the addition. But to give an appearance of perfect loyalty it quotes it in its comments. This is the art of detaching words from their context.

Subordinates go on to complete and perfect the manœuvre. They proceed to publish a mutilated text, and so make people think that the addition was perhaps a subsequent note made possibly by somebody other than the author of the Report.

And that is how history is written in Germany!

No. 102.

M. Davignon, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to all the Diplomatic Representatives of Belgium.

SIR, *Havre, 13th February*, 1915.

I HAVE the honour of sending to you herewith the completed translation of a note published by the *Times* on the 27th January last, in which Sir E. Grey replies to the explanations given by M. von Bethmann-Hollweg to the American Press on the question of the British attitude in the present war and the violation of Belgian neutrality by Germany.

I am, &c.,

DAVIGNON.

Enclosure to No. 102.

Sir E. Grey's reply to the Chancellor.

January 26, 1915.

THE Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs authorises the publication of the following observations upon the report of an interview recently granted by the German Chancellor to an American correspondent:—

It is not surprising that the German Chancellor should show anxiety to explain away his now historic phrase about a treaty being a mere "scrap of paper." The phrase has made a deep impression because the progress of the world largely depends upon the sanctity of agreements between individuals and between nations, and the policy disclosed in Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg's phrase tends to debase the legal and moral currency of civilisation.

What the German Chancellor said was that Great Britain, in requiring Germany to respect the neutrality of Belgium, "was going to make war just for a word, just for a scrap of paper"; that is, that Great Britain was making a mountain out of a

molehill. He now asks the American public to believe that he meant the exact opposite of what he said; that it was Great Britain who really regarded the neutrality of Belgium as a mere trifle, and Germany who "took her responsibilities towards neutral States seriously." The arguments by which Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg seeks to establish the two sides of this case are in flat contradiction of plain facts.

First, the German Chancellor alleges that "England in 1911 was determined to throw troops into Belgium without the assent of the Belgian Government." This allegation is absolutely false. It is based upon certain documents found in Brussels which record conversations between British and Belgian officers in 1906 and again in 1911. The fact that there is no note of these conversations at the British War Office or Foreign Office shows that they were of a purely informal character, and no military agreement of any sort was at either time made between the two Goverments. Before any conversations took place between British and Belgian officers, it was expressly laid down on the British side that the discussion of military possibilities was to be addressed to the manner in which, in case of need, British assistance could be most effectually afforded to Belgium *for the defence of her neutrality*, and on the Belgian side a marginal note upon the record explains that "the entry of the English into Belgium would only take place *after the violation of our neutrality by Germany.*" As regards the conversation of 1911, the Belgian officer said to the British, "You could only land in our country with our consent," and in 1913 Sir Edward Grey gave the Belgian Government a categorical assurance that no British Government would violate the neutrality of Belgium, and that "so long as it was not violated by any other Power we should certainly not send troops ourselves into their territory."

The Chancellor's method of misusing documents may be illustrated in this connection. He represents Sir Edward Grey as saying, "He did not believe England would take such a step, because he did not think English public opinion would justify such action." What Sir Edward Grey actually wrote was: "I said that I was sure that this Government would not be the first to violate the neutrality of Belgium, and I did not believe that any British Government would be the first to do so, nor would public opinion here ever approve of it."

If the German Chancellor wishes to know why there were conversations on military subjects between British and Belgian officers, he may find one reason in a fact well known to him, namely, that Germany was establishing an elaborate network of strategical railways, leading from the Rhine to the Belgian frontier, through a barren, thinly-populated tract; railways deliberately constructed to permit of a sudden attack upon Belgium, such as was carried out in August last. This fact alone was enough to justify any communications between Belgium and other Powers on the footing that there would be no violation of Belgian neutrality unless it were previously violated by another Power. On no other footing did Belgium ever have any such communications. In spite of these facts the German Chancellor

speaks of Belgium having thereby "abandoned" and "forfeited" her neutrality, and he implies that he would not have spoken of the German invasion as a "wrong" had he then known of the conversations of 1906 and 1911. It would seem to follow, that according to Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg's code, a wrong becomes a right if the party which is to be the subject of the wrong foresees the possibility and makes preparations to resist it. Those who are content with older and more generally accepted standards are likely to agree rather with what Cardinal Mercier said in his Pastoral letter: "Belgium was bound in honour to defend her own independence. She kept her oath. The other Powers were bound to respect and protect her neutrality. Germany violated her oath; England kept hers. These are the facts."

In support of the second part of the German Chancellor's thesis, namely, that Germany "took her responsibilities towards neutral States seriously," he alleges nothing except that "he spoke frankly of the wrong committed by Germany" in invading Belgium. That a man knows the right, while doing the wrong, is not usually accepted as proof of his serious conscientiousness.

The real nature of Germany's view of her "responsibilities towards neutral States" may, however, be learnt, on authority which cannot be disputed, by reference to the English White Paper. If those responsibilities were in truth taken seriously, why, when Germany was asked to respect the neutrality of Belgium if it were respected by France, did Germany refuse? France, when asked the corresponding question at the same time, agreed. This would have guaranteed Germany from all danger of attack through Belgium. The reason of Germany's refusal was given by Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg's colleague. It may be paraphrased in the well-known gloss upon Shakespeare:

> "Thrice is he armed that hath his quarrel just;
> But four times he that gets his blow in fust."

"They had to advance into France," said Herr von Jagow, "by the quickest and easiest way, so as to be able to get well ahead with their operations and endeavour to strike some decisive blow as early as possible."

Germany's real attitude towards Belgium was thus frankly given by the German Foreign Secretary to the British Ambassador, and the German Chancellor, in his speech to the Reichstag, claimed the right to commit a wrong in virtue of the military necessity of "hacking a way through." The treaty which forbade the wrong was by comparison a mere scrap of paper. The truth was spoken in the first statements by the two German Ministers. All the apologies and arguments which have since been forthcoming are afterthoughts to excuse and explain away a flagrant wrong. Moreover, all attacks upon Great Britain in regard to this matter, and all talk about "responsibilities towards neutral States," come badly from the man who on the 29th July asked Great Britain to enter into a bargain to condone the violation of the neutrality of Belgium.

The German Chancellor spoke to the American correspondent of his " efforts for years to bring about an understanding between England and Germany," an understanding, he added, which would have " absolutely guaranteed the peace of Europe." He omitted to mention what Mr. Asquith made public in his speech at Cardiff, that Germany required, as the price of an understanding, an unconditional pledge of England's neutrality. The British Government were ready to bind themselves not to be parties to any aggression against Germany; they were not prepared to pledge their neutrality in case of aggression by Germany. An Anglo-German understanding on the latter terms would not have meant an absolute guarantee for the peace of Europe; but it would have meant an absolutely free hand for Germany, so far as England was concerned, for Germany to break the peace of Europe.

The Chancellor says that in his conversation with the British Ambassador in August last he " may have been a bit excited at seeing the hopes and work of the whole period of his Chancellorship going for nought." Considering that at the date of the conversation (4th August) Germany had already made war on France the natural conclusion is that the shipwreck of the Chancellor's hopes consisted, not in the fact of a European war, but in the fact that England had not agreed to stand out of it.

The sincerity of the German Chancellor's professions to the American correspondent may be brought to a very simple test, the application of which is the more apposite because it serves to recall one of the leading facts which produced the present war. Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg refused the proposal, which England put forward and in which France, Italy, and Russia concurred, for a Conference at which the dispute would have been settled on fair and honourable terms without war. If he really wished to work with England for peace, why did he not accept that proposal? He must have known, after the Balkan Conference in London, that England could be trusted to play fair. Herr von Jagow had given testimony in the Reichstag to England's good faith in those negotiations. The proposal for a second Conference between the Powers was made by Sir Edward Grey with the same straightforward desire for peace as in 1912 and 1913. The German Chancellor rejected this means of averting war. He who does not will the means must not complain if the conclusion is drawn that he did not will the end.

No. 103.

M. Davignon, Minister of Foreign Affairs to all the Diplomatic Representatives abroad.

SIR, *Havre, March 4th,* 1915.

I HAVE the honour of sending you herewith the protest of the Government of the King against the declaration of the German Chancellor that Belgium had abandoned her neutrality

since 1906 by concluding an agreement with Great Britain. I would ask you to communicate this protest to the Government to which you are accredited and to give it as much publicity as possible.

I am, &c.,

DAVIGNON.

ENCLOSURE TO No. 103.

Communiqué.

"On December 2nd, 1914, the Chancellor of the German Empire declared before the Reichstag that 'on August 4th we had already certain indications of the fault committed by the Belgian Government, but I had not yet at my disposition any formal proofs in writing, though the British Government was aware that such proofs existed. Now, by means of certain documents discovered at Brussels, which I have caused to be published, it has become clear how, and in what measure, Belgium had abandoned her neutrality in favour of England. The whole world now realizes that when our troops on the night of August 3rd-4th moved into Belgian territory, they were setting foot on the soil of a State which had long ago abandoned its neutrality.'

"Belgium is justly proud of her traditions of honour and correct action, and can not pass over this campaign directed against her honour by a Chancery which has made untruthfulness its regular method, without branding the attempt with a well-merited stigma. Hard though the sufferings of the present hour may be, the Belgian people regards honour as a thing precious and immutable.

"Belgium never allowed her patrimony of national uprightness to be lessened. It was the resolve to keep that patrimony intact which dictated her decision on the night of August 2nd, and the impartial historian will repeat the fact to future generations still proud of their moral integrity.

"There is a campaign on foot to distort historical truth before the eyes of the nations, and no means are too base for employment in it. Once more the Belgian Government must speak out, and so speaking must address its declaration to every land where Right and Honour are still worshipped.

"At the outbreak of the War, the crime perpetrated against Belgium was obvious, and the interest of Germany in avowing it seemed evident—she was trying to exercise a sort of moral pressure on her victim. The violation of international law was avowed by the Imperial Chancellor from the very tribune of the Reichstag. At that moment things went so far that money was offered in compensation for lost honour to the nation that Germany was trying to fascinate! As if honour could be bought back by gold! But 'necessity knows no law'—*not kennt kein gebot.* It was said that every act was permissible—even the act

of beating down by a lightning-stroke a nation that it was necessary to crush. Once more the course of war has demonstrated that one initial crime infallibly brings about a series of subsequent crimes.

"No sooner had our soil—that soil whose inviolability had been guaranteed by Germany—suffered invasion, than part of the invading army began to disgrace itself by the systematic perpetration of arson, rape and murder on a harmless people, with incredible details of cruelty, theft and pillage. And while this flood of unparalleled barbarism was being let loose on Belgium, no act of Belgium could be found to justify the invasion: the spoiler himself confessed it.

"This situation of affairs showed up in a most unfavourable light the Empire which, in order to conquer France, had set itself to torture unoffending Belgium. The moral position was odious, and Germany had to get out of it at all costs. On the one hand the martyrdom of innocent Belgium was disturbing the conscience of the whole world. On the other hand, there were nations which this menacing triumph of brute force exposed to a similar fate, though they had no concern with the War. They were asking themselves, and with good reason, the most agonizing questions as to their own future security.

"A month after the declaration of War the German Chancery discovered at Brussels the reports of certain conversations which had taken place in 1906 and in 1912 between two British Military Attachés and two Chiefs-of-the-Staff of the Belgian Army. In order to transform these reports into documents which would justify Germany's conduct, it was necessary to garble them and to lie. Such was the only way in which the German action against Belgium could be made to appear decent. And thus Germany, when she had crushed a people that had remained scrupulously neutral, could pretend that she was enacting (though she might not have known it at the moment) the rôle of the minister of avenging justice.

"Undoubtedly this idea had its advantageous points—if it could be successfully carried out. Moral guilt could be heaped upon the Belgian people—a people whose loyal and vigorous resistance had caused the failure of the first plans of the German General Staff. They were in arms for honour alone, and they were to suffer their final outrage: it was not enough that they were sacrificed—they were to be dishonoured also. Thus it came to pass that, with a shamelessness for which history shows few parallels, the German Chancery gave out that a convention had existed, by which Belgium had betrayed her most sacred pledges and violated her own neutrality for the benefit of England. To produce an impression on those ignorant of the facts, German honesty suppressed, when the précis of the above-named conversations was published, the clause in which it was set forth that the exchange of opinion therein recorded had reference only to the situation that would be created if Belgian neutrality had already been violated.

"The Belgian Government gives to the allegations of the German Chancery the only answer that they deserve—they are

a tissue of lies, all the more shameless because they are set forth by persons who claim to have studied the original documents.

"But what are the documents which Germany produces in order to prove Belgium guilty? They are two in number:—

"(1) The report of certain interviews which took place between Lieut.-General Ducarne and Colonel Barnardiston in 1906. In the course of these interviews the British officer set forth his views as to the way in which England could help Belgium in case the latter were attacked by Germany. One phrase in the document clearly proves that Colonel Banardiston is dealing with a hypothetical case, viz., 'the entry of English troops into Belgium would only take place after a violation of Belgian neutrality by Germany.' The translation in the *Norddeutsche Zeitung* of November 25th omits this clause, the phrase which gives its exact scope and significance to the document. Moreover, the photograph of General Ducarne's report contains the words 'the officer with whom I spoke insists that our conversation has been absolutely confidential.' For the word *conversation* the *Norddeutsche Zeitung* substitutes the word '*convention.*' Colonel Barnardiston is made to say that our 'convention' would be absolutely confidential!

"Such proceedings need no comment.

"(2) The second document is the report of a conversation on the same subject in April, 1912, between Lieutenant-General Jungbluth and Lieutenant-Colonel Bridges. In the course of the conversation the former observed to the latter that 'any English intervention in favour of Belgium, if she were the victim of German aggression, could only take place with our consent.' The British Military Attaché raised the point that England might perhaps exercise her rights and duties, as one of the Powers guaranteeing Belgium, without waiting for the appeal to be made to her. This was Colonel Bridges' personal opinion only. The British Government has always held, as did the Belgian Government, that the consent of the latter was a necessary preliminary.

"The Belgian Government declares on its honour that not only was no 'Convention' ever made, but also that neither of the two Governments ever made any advances or propositions concerning the conclusion of any such convention. Moreover, the Minister of Great Britain at Brussels, who alone could contract engagements in her behalf, never intervened in these conversations. And the whole Belgian Ministry are ready to pledge themselves on oath that no conclusions arising from these conversations was ever brought before the Cabinet, or even laid before one single member of it.

"The documents which the Germans discovered give evidence of all this. Their meaning is perfectly clear provided that no part of them is either garbled or suppressed.

"In face of calumnies repeated again and again, our Government, faithfully reflecting Belgian uprightness, considers that it is its duty to inflict once more on the spoiler of Belgium the brand of infamy—which so far is his only legitimate conquest.

It also takes the opportunity of declaring, in answer to allegations whose malevolence is obvious, that:—

"(1) Before the declaration of war no French force, even of the smallest size, had entered Belgium. No trustworthy evidence can be produced to contradict this affirmation.

"(2) Not only did Belgium never refuse an offer of military help made by one of the guaranteeing Powers, but after the declaration of war she earnestly solicited the protection of her guarantors.

"(3) When undertaking, as was her duty, the vigorous defence of her fortresses, Belgium asked for, and received with gratitude, such help as her guarantors were able to place at her disposition for that defence.

"Belgium, the victim of her own loyalty, will not bow her head before any Power. Her honour defies the assaults of falsehoods. She has faith in the justice of the World. On the day of judgment the triumph belongs to the people who have sacrificed everything to serve conscientiously the cause of Truth, Right and Honour."

VIOLATION OF THE RIGHTS OF NATIONS AND OF THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF WAR IN BELGIUM—(*continued*).

Louvain; Additional Evidence. (6) German Proclamations. (7) The use of Expanding Bullets by German Troops (*illustrated*); Maltreatment of Prisoners and Wounded; Maltreatment of Hospital Staff and Mis-use of the Red Cross; Maltreatment of the Civil Population; Women and Children placed in front of German Columns; Bombardment of open and undefended places. (8) Pillage and Executions in Belgian Luxemburg; Arrest of Hostages; Incendiarism; Executions; Rape. (9) Sack of Termonde (*illustrated*):—First Bombardment, Sack, and Pillage; Arrest of Civilians, Murders, and Executions; Re-occupation of Termonde by Belgian Troops; Second Bombardment; Final Destruction. (10) Report of the London Delegacy of the Commission of Enquiry (*illustrated*):—Civilians driven into the Firing Line; Imprisonment of Civilian Hostages; Massacres. (11) Incidents at Namur; Massacre at Tamines; Pillage and Massacre at Andenne; Sack of Dinant (*illustrated*); Massacres at Hastières and Surice. (12) General conclusions, with reply to German accusations. Appendix:—Instructions to Belgian Authorities issued on August 4, 1914, and advice to Civilians. Extracts from the Pastoral Letter of His Eminence Cardinal Mercier, Archbishop of Malines, Primate of Belgium.

Price 6*d.*, post free 8½*d.*

COMMITTEE ON ALLEGED GERMAN OUTRAGES

appointed by His Majesty's Government and presided over by THE RIGHT HON. VISCOUNT BRYCE, O.M., &c., &c.

formerly British Ambassador at Washington.

REPORT.

Warrant of Appointment. Introductory Observations.

Part I. Conduct of German Troops in Belgium.

Part II. Breaches of Rules and Usages of War and Acts of Inhumanity in Invaded Territories. 1. Treatment of the Civil Population:—Killing of Non-Combatants; Treatment of Women and Children; Use of Civilians as Screens; Looting, Burning, and Destruction of Property. 2. Offences against Combatants:—Killing the Wounded or Prisoners; Firing on Hospitals; Abuse of the Red Cross and the White Flag.

Conclusions. With two maps.

[Cd. 7894] of Session 1914–15. Price 6*d.*, post free 7½*d.*

APPENDIX.

Depositions by Belgian, French, and British eye-witnesses of the Murder, Rape, Arson, Pillage, &c., by German Troops in Belgium and France.

Extracts from diaries and papers taken from German corpses or prisoners of war, with reproductions of photographs of some of those documents.

Copies of Proclamations issued by the Germans.

Convention concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land (Second Peace Conference held at the Hague in 1907—Section II. Of Hostilities. Section III. Military Authority over the Territory of the Hostile State).

Depositions taken and Papers forwarded by Professor Morgan.

[Cd. 7895] of Session 1914–15. Price 1*s.* 9*d.*, post free 2*s.* 1*d.*

The above have been reproduced in 8vo. size, viz.:—

REPORT. Price 3*d.*, post free 4½*d.*

APPENDIX. Price 6*d.*, post free 9*d.*

A cheap reprint of the Report, in smaller type, without Maps, is obtainable, Price 1d., post free 2d.

COLLECTED DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS
relating to the Outbreak of the European War.

British Diplomatic Correspondence, and Translations of the Frenc Yellow Book, the Russian Orange Book, and the Belgian Grey Book. Als Translations of the Serbian Blue Book, the German White Book, and th Austro-Hungarian Red Book, with Telegrams and Letters published officiall in the Press by the Governments of Great Britain, Russia, and Germany As an appendix to the German [redacted]e Book, the Report of the Speec delivered by the German Imperial Chancellor before the Reichstag o 4th August, 1914; and, as an appendix to the Serbian Blue Book, the Speech o Signor Giolitti before the Italian Chamber of Deputies on 5th December, 1914 The preface furnishes a tentative guide to a comparison of the various Officia Documents and to their value as a whole; and a list is given of the principa persons mentioned in the Correspondence, showing their official positions.

Price, in paper boards with cloth back, 1*s.*, post free 1*s.* 4*d.*

FOREIGN OFFICE.
Miscellaneous, 1915.

No. 5.—Correspondence between His Majesty's Government and th United States Ambassador respecting the Treatment of German Prisoners o War and Interned Civilians in the United Kingdom.

[Cd. 7815.] Price 1*d.*, post free 1½*d.*

No. 6.—Correspondence between His Majesty's Government and th United States Government respecting the Rights of Belligerents.

[Cd. 7816.] Price 3*d.*, post free 4*d.*

No. 7.—Correspondence between His Majesty's Government and th United States Ambassador respecting the Treatment of Prisoners of War an Interned Civilians in the United Kingdom and Germany respectively.

[Cd. 7817.] Price 9½*d.*, post free 1*s.*

No. 8.—Correspondence between His Majesty's Government and th United States Ambassador respecting the Release of Interned Civilians, an the Exchange of Diplomatic and Consular Officers, and of certain classes o Naval and Military Officers, Prisoners of War, in the United Kingdom an Germany respectively.

[Cd. 7857.] Price 7½*d.*, post free 9½*d.*

No. 11.—Reports by United States Officials on the Treatment of Britis Prisoners of War and Interned Civilians at certain Places of Detention i Germany. (*In continuation of* [Cd. 7817]).

[Cd. 7861.] Price 3*d.*, post free 4*d.*

No. 12.—The Treatment of Prisoners of War in England and German during the first eight months of the War.

[Cd. 7862.] Price 1*d.*, post free 2*d.*

No. 13.—Note from the United States Ambassador transmitting a Repor dated 8th June, 1915, on the conditions at present existing in the Internmen Camp at Ruhleben.

[Cd. 7863.] Price 1*d.*, post free 1½*d.*

No. 14.—Correspondence with the United States Ambassador respectin the Treatment of British Prisoners of War and Interned Civilians in Germany

[Cd. 7959.] Price 6*d.*, post free 7½*d.*

No. 15.—Further correspondence with the United States Ambassado respecting the Treatment of British Prisoners of War and Interned Civilian in Germany.

[Cd. 7961.] Price 2½*d.*, post free 3½*d.*

No. 16.—Austrian and German Papers found in possession of Mr. Jame F. J. Archibald, Falmouth, August 30th, 1915.

[Cd. 8012.] Price 2½*d.*, post free 3½*d.*

Gaylord
PAMPHLET BINDER
Syracuse, N. Y.
Stockton, Calif.

Cornell University Library
D 505.B3 1915
Second Belgian grey book.
3 1924 027 922 891
olin